Zitatform

Strobl, Eric & Frank Walsh (2011): The ambiguous effect of minimum wages on hours. In: Labour economics, Jg. 18, H. 2, S. 218-228. DOI:10.1016/j.labeco.2010.09.004

Abstract

"In a competitive model we ease the assumption that efficiency units of labour are the product of hours and workers. We show that a minimum wage may either increase or decrease hours per worker and the change will have the opposite sign to the slope of the equilibrium hours hourly wage locus. Similarly, total hours worked may rise or fall. We illustrate the results throughout with a Cobb-Douglas example." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Zitatform

Tamada, Keiko (2011): Analysis of the determinants of minimum wages in Japan. In: Japan labor review, Jg. 8, H. 2, S. 24-41.

Abstract

"This paper overviews Japan's minimum wage system and examines the determinants of 'guideline increases (meyasu-gaku),' which are the increases in minimum wages recommended by the central council, and the actual minimum wage increases set by the regional councils. In Japan, minimum wages are deliberated upon mainly by advisory councils. The central council recommends the guideline increases and the regional councils set the actual increases. Our analysis found that the guideline increases are positively affected by the wage growth rates. Comments by public interest at meetings of the central council have suggested that their decisions on the guideline increases are influenced by the wage growth rate, and our estimation results also support the hypothesis that the guideline increases are positively affected by the wage growth rate. Because the council comprises workers represented by union officials, we examined the possible Impact of the unionization rate on the guideline increases. We found that the guideline increase is not affected by the unionization rate. Our analysis indicated that the actual minimum wage increases are set close to the guideline increases. We also found that the actual increase is positively affected by the active job openings-to-applicants ratio. As with the guideline increases, however, our analysis showed that the actual increase is not affected by the unionization rate. In addition, we found that in 2007 and 2008, when the guideline increases were determined in light of the debates conducted by the Roundtable to Promote Strategy to Enhance Growth Potential (seicho-ryoku sokoage senryaku suisin entaku kaigi) which set a policy direction toward minimum wage increases, the actual increases were larger than those in other years." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Zitatform

Tonin, Mirco (2011): Underreporting of earnings and the minimum wage spike. (IZA discussion paper 5942), Bonn, 16 S.

Abstract

"This paper documents a positive correlation within European labour markets between the proportion of full-time employees with earnings on the minimum wage and the extent of underreporting of earnings in the economy. Using a simple model of a competitive labour market, I show how this correlation can emerge as a result of the common dependence of both quantities on the strength of enforcement of fiscal regulation. This suggests that a high spike in the wage distribution at the minimum wage level is, in some contexts, an issue of fiscal enforcement, more than a labour market issue." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Zitatform

Tonin, Mirco (2011): Minimum wage and tax evasion. Theory and evidence. In: Journal of Public Economics, Jg. 95, H. 11/12, S. 1635-1651.

Abstract

"This paper examines the interaction between minimum wage legislation and tax evasion by employed labor. I develop a model in which firms and workers may agree to report less than the true amount of earnings to the fiscal authorities. I show that introducing a minimum wage creates a spike in the distribution of declared earnings and induces higher compliance by some agents, thus reducing their disposable income. The comparison of food consumption and of the consumption-income gap before and after the massive minimum wage hike that took place in Hungary in 2001 reveals that households who appeared to benefit from the hike actually experienced a drop compared to similar but unaffected households, thus supporting the prediction of the theory." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Zitatform

Walwei, Ulrich (2011): Mindestlöhne: Manna oder Teufelszeug? In: Palais Biron. Das Magazin für Vordenker H. 12, S. 26-30.

Abstract

"Der Niedriglohnsektor gewinnt in Deutschland zunehmend an Bedeutung und wächst immer weiter. Insbesondere um die sozialen Folgen dieser Entwicklung in Grenzen zu halten, wird gerade im politischen Raum der Ruf nach möglichst flächendeckenden Mindestlohnregelungen immer lauter. Mindestlöhne sind aber nicht unumstritten. Der Beitrag untersucht auf Basis der vorliegenden Forschungsbefunde, ob und unter welchen Bedingungen Mindestlöhne dem Arbeitsmarkt guttun oder schaden können." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)

Abstract

"The economic crisis presented considerable challenges to industrial relations across the EU. This report reviews trends and developments in the relationships between workers, employers, their respective representatives and public authorities during 2008-10. It begins with an overview of the main characteristics of industrial relations institutions before analysing the strategies and perspectives of social partners and social dialogue developments in the face of the crisis. The report then examines wage bargaining, wage flexibility and minimum wages as well as the implications for industrial relations of the transition to a low-carbon economy. Finally, the report gives an overview of EU-level social dialogue and legislative developments" (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Zitatform

(2011): Entschließung des Bundesrates - Faire und sichere Arbeitsbedingungen durch Implementierung eines flächendeckenden gesetzlichen Mindestlohnes. Antrag der Länder Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg, Rheinland-Pfalz. (Verhandlungen des Bundesrates. Drucksachen 816/11 (09.12.2011)), 5 S.

Abstract

"Der Antrag der Länder Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg, Rheinland-Pfalz fordert die Bundesregierung auf, einen Gesetzentwurf für einen allgemeinen flächendeckenden gesetzlichen Mindestlohn von 8,50 Euro (brutto) vorzulegen. Der Mindestlohn soll von einer unabhängigen Kommission nach dem Vorbild Großbritanniens (Low Pay Commission) jährlich überprüft und ein Vorschlag erarbeitet werden. Und es soll eine Kontrolle der Einhaltung des flächendeckenden gesetzlichen Mindestlohnes durch staatliche Stellen (Zollbehörden) stattfinden." (Textauszug, IAB-Doku)

Zitatform

Addison, John T. & Orgul Demet Ozturk (2010): Minimum wages, labor market institutions, and female employment and unemployment. A cross-country analysis. (IZA discussion paper 5162), Bonn, 32 S.

Abstract

"This paper estimates the effect of minimum wage regulation in 16 OECD countries, 1970-2008. Our treatment is motivated by Neumark and Wascher's (2004) seminal cross-country study using panel methods to estimate minimum wage effects among teenagers and young adults. Apart from the longer time interval examined here, a major departure of the present study is the focus on prime-age females, a group typically neglected in the component minimum wage literature. Another is our deployment of time-varying policy and institutional regressors. Yet another is our examination of unemployment and participation outcomes in addition to employment effects. We report strong evidence of adverse employment effects among adult females and lower participation, even if the unemployment effects are muted. Although we report some similar findings to Neumark and Wascher as to the role of labor market institutions and policies, we do not observe the same patterns in the institutional data; in particular, we can reject for our target group their finding of stronger disemployment effects in countries with the least regulated markets." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Zitatform

Arentz, Oliver & Johann Eekhoff (2010): Mindestlöhne verringern die Beschäftigungschancen für Bezieher von Arbeitslosengeld II. In: Orientierungen zur Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik H. 123, S. 24-28.

Abstract

Die Hartz-Reform wird mit Recht als die umfassendste Reform des Sozialstaats in den letzten Jahrzehnten bezeichnet. Sie stellt die aktuelle Konkretisierung der grundgesetzlich garantierten Mindestsicherung dar. Bei einem Großteil der Hilfebezieher ist aber von einer grundsätzlichen Bereitschaft zur Aufnahme einer Beschäftigung auszugehen. Hier erweisen sich jedoch die Mindestlöhne als Arbeitsmarkthemmnis, da sie gering qualifizierte Arbeitnehmer vom Arbeitsmarkt ausschließen. Ihre Wertschöpfung reicht bei den gegebenen Mindestlöhnen nicht aus, um die Kosten der Beschäftigung zu decken. Eine Abschaffung der Mindestlöhne würde motivierten Hilfebeziehern die Möglichkeit zur Ausübung einer Beschäftigung geben, ihre Produktivität zum Vorteil der Gesellschaft nutzen und die Steuerzahler entlasten. (IAB)

Zitatform

Autor, David, Alan Manning & Christopher L. Smith (2010): The contribution of the minimum wage to U.S. wage inequality over three decades. A reassessment. (CEP discussion paper 1025), London, 70 S.

Abstract

"We reassess the effect of state and federal minimum wages on U.S. earnings inequality, attending to two issues that appear to bias earlier work: violation of the assumed independence of state wage levels and state wage dispersion, and errors-in-variables that inflate impact estimates via an analogue of the well known division bias problem. We find that erosion of the real minimum wage raises inequality in the lower tail of the wage distribution (the 50/10 wage ratio), but the impacts are typically less than half as large as those reported in the literature and are almost negligible for males. Nevertheless, the estimated effects of the minimum wage on points of the wage distribution extend to wage percentiles where the minimum is nominally non-binding, implying spillovers. We structurally estimate these spillovers and show that their relative importance grows as the nominal minimum wage becomes less binding. Subsequent analysis underscores, however, that spillovers and measurement error (absent spillovers) have similar implications for the effect of the minimum on the shape of the lower tail of the measured wage distribution. With available precision, we cannot reject the hypothesis that estimated spillovers to non-binding percentiles are due to reporting artifacts. Accepting this null, the implied effect of the minimum wage on the actual wage distribution is smaller than the effect of the minimum wage on the measured wage distribution." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Zitatform

Autor, David, Alan Manning & Christopher L. Smith (2010): The contribution of the minimum wage to U.S. wage inequality over three decades. A reassessment. (NBER working paper 16533), Cambridge, Mass., 68 S. DOI:10.3386/w16533

Abstract

"We reassess the effect of state and federal minimum wages on U.S. earnings inequality, attending to two issues that appear to bias earlier work: violation of the assumed independence of state wage levels and state wage dispersion, and errors-in-variables that inflate impact estimates via an analogue of the well known division bias problem. We find that erosion of the real minimum wage raises inequality in the lower tail of the wage distribution (the 50/10 wage ratio), but the impacts are typically less than half as large as those reported in the literature and are almost negligible for males. Nevertheless, the estimated effects of the minimum wage on points of the wage distribution extend to wage percentiles where the minimum is nominally non-binding, implying spillovers. We structurally estimate these spillovers and show that their relative importance grows as the nominal minimum wage becomes less binding. Subsequent analysis underscores, however, that spillovers and measurement error (absent spillovers) have similar implications for the effect of the minimum on the shape of the lower tail of the measured wage distribution. With available precision, we cannot reject the hypothesis that estimated spillovers to non-binding percentiles are due to reporting artifacts. Accepting this null, the implied effect of the minimum wage on the actual wage distribution is smaller than the effect of the minimum wage on the measured wage distribution." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Zitatform

Avouyi-Dovi, Sanvi, Denis Fougère & Erwan Gautier (2010): Wage rigidity, collective bargaining and the minimum wage. Evidence from French agreement data. (CEPR discussion paper 7932), London, 48 S.

Abstract

"Using several unique data sets on wage agreements at both the firm- and the industry-levels in France, we examine the impact of typical European wage-setting institutions on the form and the degree of wage rigidity. We highlight different stylized facts concerning wage stickiness. First, in France, the typical duration of a wage agreement is one year. Consequently, a Taylor (1980) -type model appears to reproduce appropriately the distribution of agreement durations. Some 30 percent of settlements stipulate several predetermined wage changes during the year following the date of signature of the agreement. The frequency of wage agreements is highly seasonal, but the dates at which agreements take effect are more staggered. The date at which the national minimum wage level is revised each year has a significant impact on the timetable of wage agreements, both at the firm- and at the industry-levels. Wage increases negotiated at these two levels mainly depend on the inflation regime, the firm profitability and the proportion of minimum-wage workers in the same industry." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Zitatform

Basu, Arnab K., Nancy H. Chau & Ravi Kanbur (2010): Turning a blind eye: Costly enforcement, credible commitment and minimum wage laws. In: The economic journal, Jg. 120, H. 543, S. 244-269. DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02298.x

Abstract

"In many countries, non-compliance with minimum wage legislation is widespread and authorities may be seen as having turned a blind eye to legislation they have themselves passed. We show that turning a blind eye can indeed be an equilibrium phenomenon with ex post credibility, in a model of minimum wage policy with imperfect competition, imperfect enforcement and imperfect commitment. Since credible enforcement requires costly ex post transfer of income from employers to workers, a government concerned only with efficiency but not with distribution is shown, paradoxically, to be unable to credibly elicit efficiency improvements via a minimum wage reform." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Zitatform

Belman, Dale L. & Paul Wolfson (2010): The effect of legislated minimum wage increases on employment and hours. A dynamic analysis. In: Labour, Jg. 24, H. 1, S. 1-25. DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9914.2010.00468.x

Abstract

"We present a dynamic policy simulation analysing what would have happened to wages, employment, and total hours had the federal minimum wage increased in September 1998, a year after the last actual increase in our data. Prior work suggests that employment responses take 6 years to play out. Using a time-series model for 23 low-wage industries, we find a positive response of average wages over 54 months following an increase in the minimum wage, but neither employment nor hours can be distinguished from random noise. Ignoring confidence intervals, the adjustment of hours is complete after 1 year, the adjustment of employment after no more than two and one half years." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Zitatform

Bieräugel, Roland, Oliver Nüchter & Alfons Schmid (2010): Einstellungen der Bevölkerung zu Mindestlöhnen in Deutschland. In: WSI-Mitteilungen, Jg. 63, H. 1, S. 50-57. DOI:10.5771/0342-300X-2010-1-50

Abstract

"Die politische Öffentlichkeit diskutiert kontrovers über den Mindestlohn, während die Sichtweise der Bevölkerung bisher kaum erforscht ist. Die Demoskopie belegt zwar eine mehrheitliche Zustimmung, kann allerdings die zugrunde liegenden Faktoren nicht erklären. Der Beitrag beleuchtet die Wahrnehmungen und Beurteilungen der Bevölkerung zur Einführung eines Mindestlohns. Wie verteilt sich Zustimmung und Ablehnung in der Bevölkerung? Wie hoch sollte der Mindestlohn sein? Warum werden Mindestlöhne abgelehnt? Wie werden die Wirkungen von Mindestlöhnen beurteilt? Die Einstellungen unterscheiden sich entlang sozialstruktureller und soziodemografischer Merkmale. Unsere Ergebnisse geben Hinweise darauf, dass von dem um subjektive Faktoren wie die Zufriedenheit erweiterten, ökonomischen Rationalmodell insgesamt die größte Erklärungskraft ausgeht. Einkommenslage, Erwerbsstatus sowie subjektive Zufriedenheit mit dem eigenen Leben zeigen die stärksten bivariaten Zusammenhänge mit Haltungen zum Mindestlohn. Zudem scheinen Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen des Individuums bei der Einschätzung von Regelungen, die in die sozialen Verteilungsverhältnisse eingreifen, ein wesentlicher Bezugspunkt der Urteilenden zu sein." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)

Zitatform

Bispinck, Reinhard (2010): Niedriglöhne und der Flickenteppich von (unzureichenden) Mindestlöhnen in Deutschland. (WSI-Report 04), Düsseldorf, 19 S.

Abstract

"Die politische Auseinandersetzung um die Begrenzung des Niedriglohnsektors in Deutschland ist nach wie vor in vollem Gang. Zwar gewinnt die Forderung nach einem einheitlichen gesetzlichen Mindestlohn in der Bevölkerung und bei den politischen Parteien immer mehr an Unterstützung, aber durchgesetzt ist sie noch keineswegs. Bislang konnten die Gewerkschaften lediglich einen eher vorsichtigen Ausbau des vorhandenen Instrumentariums erreichen. Der WSI-Report analysiert Reichweite, Niveau und Wirksamkeit des bestehenden Regelwerks zur Festsetzung von Mindestarbeitseinkommen. Er informiert außerdem über die Regulierungsvorstellungen der Betriebsräte auf Basis der jüngsten WSI-Betriebsrätebefragung." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)

Zitatform

Boockmann, Bernhard (2010): The combined employment effects of minimum wages and labor market regulation. A meta-analysis. (IZA discussion paper 4983), Bonn, 30 S.

Abstract

"This paper provides a meta-analysis of 55 empirical studies estimating the employment effects of minimum wages in 15 industrial countries. It strongly confirms the notion that the effects of minimum wages are heterogeneous between countries. As possible sources of heterogeneity, it considers the benefit replacement ratio, employment protection and the collective bargaining system. While the results are in line with theoretical expectations, the degree to which they are robust differs across these institutions." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Zitatform

Boockmann, Bernhard (2010): The combined employment effects of minimum wages and labor market regulation. A meta-analysis. (IAW-Diskussionspapiere 65), Tübingen, 35 S.

Abstract

"This paper provides a meta-analysis of 55 empirical studies estimating the employment effects of minimum wages in 15 industrial countries. It strongly confirms the notion that the effects of minimum wages are heterogeneous between countries. As possible sources of heterogeneity, it considers the benefit replacement ratio, employment protection and the collective bargaining system. While the results are in line with theoretical expectations, the degree to which they are robust differs across these institutions." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Zitatform

Borjas, George J. (2010): Labor economics. Boston u.a.: MacGraw-Hill, 560 S.

Abstract

"The Fifth Edition builds on the features and concepts that made the first four editions successful, updating and adding new content to keep the text on the cusp of recent events in the Labor Economics field. The new edition continues to be the most concise book in the market, enabling the instructor to teach all relevant material in a semester-long class. Despite the book's brevity, the instructor will find that all of the key topics in labor economics are efficiently covered in the Fifth Edition. Thanks to updated pedagogy, new end-of-chapter material, and even stronger instructor support, the Fifth Edition of Labor Economics remains one of the most relevant textbooks in the market." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Zitatform

Bosch, Gerhard & Claudia Weinkopf (2010): Minimum wage systems and changing industrial relations in Europe. National report Germany. Manchester, 44 S.

Abstract

"In Germany, minimum wages are established by means of collective bargaining. Statutory provision does play a role, but only in certain sectors through making regional collective agreements generally binding (eg. hairdressing and security) or in the context of the Law on Posting of Workers as in construction and very recently in cleaning and postal services. With the decline of collective bargaining coverage and limited use of extension mechanisms, there is increasing concern among social partners that many low paid workers have no minimum wage protection; the share of workers not covered in 2004 was close to one in three in western Germany and one in two in eastern Germany. Along with other changes, including requiring long-term unemployed workers to accept any offer of a legal job after 12 months and the growth of very low paid jobs, there is now considerable political debate on a new form of statutory minimum wage." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))