matching – Suchprozesse am Arbeitsmarkt
Offene Stellen bei gleichzeitiger Arbeitslosigkeit - was Arbeitsmarkttheorien u. a. mit "unvollkommener Information" begründen, ist für Unternehmen und Arbeitsuchende oft nur schwer nachzuvollziehen: Unternehmen können freie Stellen nicht besetzen, trotzdem finden Arbeitsuchende nur schwer den passenden Job. Wie gestalten sich die Suchprozesse bei Unternehmen und Arbeitsuchenden, welche Konzessionen sind beide Seiten bereit einzugehen, wie lässt sich das "matching" verbessern?
Diese Infoplattform bietet wissenschaftliche Literatur zur theoretischen und empirischen Auseinandersetzung mit dem Thema.
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Literaturhinweis
Skills, signals, and employability: An experimental investigation (2020)
Piopiunik, Marc; Simon, Lisa; Schwerdt, Guido; Wößmann, Ludger;Zitatform
Piopiunik, Marc, Guido Schwerdt, Lisa Simon & Ludger Wößmann (2020): Skills, signals, and employability: An experimental investigation. In: European Economic Review, Jg. 123. DOI:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103374
Abstract
"Because most skills of labor-market entrants are not directly observed by employers, individuals acquire skill signals. To study which signals are valued by employers, we randomize several skill signals on resumes of fictitious applicants among which we ask a large representative sample of German human-resource managers to choose. We find that signals in both studied domains – cognitive and social skills – have significant effects on being invited for a job interview. Consistent with their relevance, expectedness, and credibility, different signals are effective for apprenticeship applicants and college graduates. While GPAs and social skills are significant for both genders, females are particularly rewarded for IT and language skills. Older HR managers value school grades less and other signals more. HR managers in larger firms value college grades more." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, © 2020 Elsevier) ((en))
Ähnliche Treffer
früher erschienen als: IZA discussion paper , 11283 -
Literaturhinweis
Estimation of a Roy/search/compensating differential model of the labor market (2020)
Taber, Christopher; Vejlin, Rune;Zitatform
Taber, Christopher & Rune Vejlin (2020): Estimation of a Roy/search/compensating differential model of the labor market. In: Econometrica, Jg. 88, H. 3, S. 1031-1069. DOI:10.3982/ECTA14441
Abstract
"In this paper, we develop a model that captures key components of the Roy model, a search model, compensating differentials, and human capital accumulation on-the-job. We establish which components of the model can be non-parametrically identified and which ones cannot. We estimate the model and use it to assess the relative contribution of the different factors for overall wage inequality. We find that variation in premarket skills (the key feature of the Roy model) is the most important component to account for the majority of wage variation. We also demonstrate that there is substantial interaction between the other components, most notably, that the importance of the job match obtained by search frictions varies from around 4% to around 29%, depending on how we account for other components. Inequality due to preferences for non-pecuniary aspects of the job (which leads to compensating differentials) and search are both very important for explaining other features of the data. Search is important for turnover, but so are preferences for non-pecuniary aspects of jobs as one-third of all choices between two jobs would have resulted in a different outcome if the worker only cared about wages." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
Ähnliche Treffer
auch erschienen als: NBER working paper , 22439 -
Literaturhinweis
Do high-wage jobs attract more applicants? Directed search evidence from the online labor market (2019)
Banfi, Stefano; Villena-Roldán, Benjamín;Zitatform
Banfi, Stefano & Benjamín Villena-Roldán (2019): Do high-wage jobs attract more applicants? Directed search evidence from the online labor market. In: Journal of labor economics, Jg. 37, H. 3, S. 715-746. DOI:10.1086/702627
Abstract
"Labor markets become more efficient in theory if job seekers direct their search. Using online job board data, we show that high-wage ads attract more applicants as in directed search models. Due to distinctive data features, we also estimate significant but milder directed search for hidden (or implicit) wages, suggesting that ad texts and requirements tacitly convey wage information. Since explicit-wage ads often target unskilled workers, other estimates in the literature ignoring hidden-wage ads may suffer from selection bias. Moreover, job ad requirements are aligned with their applicants' traits, as predicted in directed search models with heterogeneity." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Structural empirical evaluation of job search monitoring (2019)
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Klaauw, Bas van der;Zitatform
Berg, Gerard J. van den & Bas van der Klaauw (2019): Structural empirical evaluation of job search monitoring. In: International Economic Review, Jg. 60, H. 2, S. 879-903. DOI:10.1111/iere.12376
Abstract
"To evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers, it is important to take account of post-unemployment wages and job-to-job mobility. We structurally estimate a model with search channels, using an RCT in which monitoring is randomized. The data include registers and survey data on search behavior. We find that the opportunity to move to better-paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution towards formal search channels in unemployment. Job mobility compensates for adverse long-run effects of monitoring on wages. We examine counterfactual policies against moral hazard, like reemployment bonuses and changes of the benefits path." (Author's abstract, Published by arrangement with John Wiley & Sons) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Upward-sloping labor supply, firing costs and collusion (2019)
Capuano, Carlo; Grassi, Iacopo;Zitatform
Capuano, Carlo & Iacopo Grassi (2019): Upward-sloping labor supply, firing costs and collusion. In: Economics Bulletin, Jg. 39, H. 1, S. 502-512.
Abstract
"We analyze the sustainability of collusion in a supergames framework wherein the only input is a highly qualified type of labor, with its supply being upward-sloping and the wage being sensitive to the industry input demand. Hence, when seeking to expand production, firms have to attract additional employees by offering them higher wages. We compare equilibria and social welfare in both quantity and price competitions, as well as by considering non-negligible firing costs. We prove that: the sensitivity of wages to the industry demand for labor facilitates collusion in price competition (in quantity competition, the reverse is true); in both price and quantity competitions, collusion should be welfare-enhancing when the sensitivity of wage is high enough. Moreover, the introduction of firing costs, decreasing the incentive to cut the production after a temporary rise, reduces the deviation profits making collusion easier to sustain. Our results can be extended to any context where input prices are endogenous." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Financial risk and unemployment (2019)
Zitatform
Eckstein, Zvi, Ofer Setty & David Weiss (2019): Financial risk and unemployment. In: International Economic Review, Jg. 60, H. 2, S. 475-516. DOI:10.1111/iere.12360
Abstract
"There is a strong correlation between corporate interest rates, their spreads relative to Treasuries, and the unemployment rate. We model how corporate interest rates affect equilibrium unemployment and vacancies, in a Diamond - Mortesen - Pissarides search and matching model. Our simple model permits the exploration of U.S. business cycle statistics through the lens of financial shocks. We calibrate the model using U.S. data without targeting business cycle statistics. Volatility in the corporate interest rate can explain a quantitatively meaningful portion of the labor market. Data on corporate firms support the hypothesis that firms facing more volatile financial conditions have more volatile employment." (Author's abstract, Published by arrangement with John Wiley & Sons) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Inconsistent time preferences and on-the-job search: When it pays to be naive (2019)
Fahn, Matthias; Seibel, Regina;Zitatform
Fahn, Matthias & Regina Seibel (2019): Inconsistent time preferences and on-the-job search. When it pays to be naive. (CESifo working paper 7604), München, 21 S.
Abstract
"We study optimal employment contracts for present-biased employees who can conduct on-the-job-search. Presuming that firms cannot offer long-term contracts, we find that individuals who are naive about their present bias will actually be better off than sophisticated or time-consistent individuals. Moreover, they search more, which partially counteracts the inefficiencies caused by their present bias." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Job search under asymmetric information: endogenous wage dispersion and unemployment stigma (2019)
Feng, Shuaizhang; Zheng, Bingyong; Lefgren, Lars; Platt, Brennan C.;Zitatform
Feng, Shuaizhang, Lars Lefgren, Brennan C. Platt & Bingyong Zheng (2019): Job search under asymmetric information: endogenous wage dispersion and unemployment stigma. In: Economic Theory, Jg. 67, H. 4, S. 817-851. DOI:10.1007/s00199-018-1099-7
Abstract
"We present a model of directed job search with asymmetric information regarding worker type. While job applicants know their productivity type, firms can only observe the duration of unemployment as well as a noisy signal of worker type. Firms can offer an unscreened wage or a wage that is conditioned on passing the screening and the duration of unemployment. This framework leads to three possible equilibria, which depend on model parameter values. We describe the circumstances under, which each equilibrium may result and the empirical implications of each equilibrium. Our model sheds light into wage scarring, unemployment duration, wage dispersion and firm-wage sorting, as well as the effects of unemployment insurance and minimum wages on search behavior and the distribution of wages." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Labor supply, income distribution, and tax progressivity in a search model (2019)
Fu, Zhiming; Wu, Liang; Zhuang, Ziguan;Zitatform
Fu, Zhiming, Liang Wu & Ziguan Zhuang (2019): Labor supply, income distribution, and tax progressivity in a search model. In: The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Jg. 19, H. 1, S. 1-18. DOI:10.1515/bejm-2017-0185
Abstract
"We develop a search model with risk-averse households to study the impact of tax progressivity on labor supply and income inequality across education groups. Labor supply responses are considered along both intensive and extensive margins. Our quantitative results are consistent with those of the existing empirical literature. First, we find that a decline in tax progressivity associated with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has a significant impact on the aggregate labor supply with approximately 61 percent occurred along the extensive margin. Second, households differ in their labor and income responses to tax reform. A decline in tax progressivity changes the income composition of each household by affecting labor supplies and asset holdings. This leads to an increase in income inequality. Therefore, the tax share paid by the most educated group rises due to an increase in capital income after tax reforms are instituted." (Author's abstract, © De Gruyter) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Social comparisons in job search (2019)
Zitatform
Fu, Jingcheng, Martin Sefton & Richard Upward (2019): Social comparisons in job search. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Jg. 168, S. 338-361. DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.10.013
Abstract
Using a laboratory experiment we examine how social comparisons affect behavior in a sequential search task. In a control treatment subjects search in isolation, while in two other treatments subjects get feedback on the search decisions and outcomes of a partner subject. The average level and rate of decline of reservation wages are similar across treatments. Nevertheless, subjects who are able to make social comparisons search differently from those who search in isolation. Within a search task we observe a reference wage effect: when a partner exits, the subject chooses a new reservation wage which is increasing in partner income. We also observe a social comparison effect between search tasks: subjects whose partners in a previous task searched for longer choose a higher reservation wage in the next task. Our findings imply that the provision of social information can change job-seekers search behavior. (Author's Abstract, IAB-Doku)
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Literaturhinweis
The Quality-Weighted Matching Function: Did the German Labour Market Reforms Trade off Efficiency against Job Quality? (2019)
Zitatform
Gartner, Hermann, Thomas Rothe & Enzo Weber (2019): The Quality-Weighted Matching Function: Did the German Labour Market Reforms Trade off Efficiency against Job Quality? (IAB-Discussion Paper 24/2019), Nürnberg, 14 S.
Abstract
"Wir analysieren den Zielkonflikt zwischen Umfang und Qualität der Beschäftigung, indem wir eine erweiterte Matching-Funktion schätzen, worin die Zahl der neue Beschäftigungsverhältnisse (Matches) mit deren Qualität gewichtet wird. Diesen Ansatz verwenden wir, um die Auswirkungen der Hartz-Reformen der Jahre 2003 bis 2005 auf den Arbeitsmarkt zu bewerten. In der Tat bestätigt sich, dass ein Teil der zusätzlichen Beschäftigungsverhältnisse durch schlechtere Qualität erkauft war. Auch bei konstanter Qualität der neuen Matches wäre aber gut die Hälfte des positiven Effektes auf die Matchingeffizienz infolge der Hartz-Reformen verblieben." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)
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Literaturhinweis
The Beveridge curve and labour market flows - a reinterpretation (2019)
Gottfries, Nils; Stadin, Karolina;Zitatform
Gottfries, Nils & Karolina Stadin (2019): The Beveridge curve and labour market flows - a reinterpretation. (CESifo working paper 7689), München, 52 S.
Abstract
"According to search-matching theory, the Beveridge curve slopes downward because vacancies are filled more quickly when unemployment is high. Using monthly panel data for local labour markets in Sweden we find no (or only weak) evidence that high unemployment makes it easier to fill vacancies. Instead, there are few vacancies when unemployment is high because there is a low inflow of new vacancies. We construct a simple model with on-the-job search and show that it is broadly consistent with the cyclical behaviour of stocks and flows in the labour market also without search frictions. In periods of high unemployment, fewer employed job seekers find new jobs and this leads to a smaller inflow of new vacancies." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Misallocation of talent and human capital: Political economy analysis (2019)
Gradstein, Mark;Zitatform
Gradstein, Mark (2019): Misallocation of talent and human capital. Political economy analysis. In: European Economic Review, Jg. 118, H. September, S. 148-157. DOI:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.05.010
Abstract
"Mismatches in the labor market, specifically because of underrepresentation of various population groups, carry significant economic cost. In this paper we argue, using a simple analytical model that an additional cost component is related to the effect of such underrepresentation on incentives to invest in human capital, which results in a mutual feedback relationship between the labor market and the skill acquisition market and may lead to economy's divergence. Further, it is shown that an initially advantaged group may have an incentive to minimize the bias against the disadvantaged group, and that political enfranchisement is the means to achieve a commitment to such a policy." (Author's abstract, © 2019 Elsevier) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Two-sided matching with (almost) one-sided preferences (2019)
Haeringer, Guillaume; Iehlé, Vincent;Zitatform
Haeringer, Guillaume & Vincent Iehlé (2019): Two-sided matching with (almost) one-sided preferences. In: American Economic Journal. Microeconomics, Jg. 11, H. 3, S. 155-190. DOI:10.1257/mic.20170115
Abstract
"In a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by considering only one side's preferences and the mutually acceptable pairs of agents. Our methodology consists of identifying impossible matches, i.e., pairs of agents that can never be matched together in a stable matching of any problem consistent with the partial data. We analyze data from the French academic job market for mathematicians and show that the match of about 45 percent of positions (and about 60 percent of candidates) does not depend on the preferences of the hired candidates, unobserved and submitted at the final stage of the market." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Performance pay and applicant screening (2019)
Zitatform
Jirjahn, Uwe & Jens Mohrenweiser (2019): Performance pay and applicant screening. In: BJIR, Jg. 57, H. 3, S. 540-575. DOI:10.1111/bjir.12443
Abstract
"Using German establishment data, we show that the relationship between intensity of individual-based performance pay and intensity of applicant screening depends on the nature of production. In establishments with increased multitasking, performance pay is positively associated with applicant screening. By contrast, in establishments without increased multitasking, performance pay is negatively associated with applicant screening.We do not find a similar pattern of results for group-based performance pay or profit-sharing. Our findings fit the hypothesis that individual-based performance pay induces a positive self-sorting of employees if jobs are less multifaceted. In this case, employers with a high intensity of performance pay do not need intensive applicant screening to ensure a high quality of matches between workers and jobs. However, if jobs are more multifaceted, individual-based performance pay can entail problems of adverse self-sorting. In order to mitigate or overcome these problems, employers making intensive use of performance pay also screen applicants more intensively." (Author's abstract, Published by arrangement with John Wiley & Sons) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
The role of spatial and skill mismatches: explaining long-term unemployment in Paris (2019)
Zitatform
L'Horty, Yannick & Florent Sari (2019): The role of spatial and skill mismatches. Explaining long-term unemployment in Paris. In: Regional Studies. Journal of the Regional Studies Association, Jg. 53, H. 2, S. 283-296. DOI:10.1080/00343404.2018.1462480
Abstract
"In the Paris region, one can observe simultaneously the coexistence of a large and dynamic job pool with long-lasting periods of unemployment. This paradox reveals the importance of skill and spatial mismatch mechanisms, which are often used to explain disparities in local labour market outcomes. This paper uses several spatial models to measure the effects of these two mechanisms on unemployment durations in the Paris region. The results show that both problems affect municipalities close to the centre of Paris, while unemployment situations in municipalities on the fringes of the region are mainly affected by a lack of local employment dynamism." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Search and multiple jobholding (2019)
Zitatform
Lalé, Etienne (2019): Search and multiple jobholding. (IZA discussion paper 12294), Bonn, 52 S.
Abstract
"A search-theoretic model of the labor market with idiosyncratic fluctuations in hours worked, search both off- and on-the-job, and multiple jobholding is developed. Taking on a second job entails a commitment to hold onto the primary employer, enabling the worker to use the primary job as her outside option to bargain with the secondary employer. The model performs well at explaining multiple jobholding inflows and outflows, and it is informative for understanding the secular decline in multiple jobholding. While some worry that this decline heralds a less-flexible labor market, the model reveals that it has contributed to reducing search frictions." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Selective hiring and welfare analysis in labor market models (2019)
Zitatform
Merkl, Christian & Thijs van Rens (2019): Selective hiring and welfare analysis in labor market models. In: Labour economics, Jg. 57, H. April, S. 117-130. DOI:10.1016/j.labeco.2019.01.008
Abstract
"Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in most labor market models all workers have the same probability of being hired. We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. We set up a model that is isomorphic to a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selective hiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but implications for welfare are different for two reasons. First, a hiring externality occurs with random but not with selective hiring. Second, the welfare costs of unemployment are much larger with selective hiring, because unemployment risk is distributed unequally across workers." (Author's abstract, © 2019 Elsevier) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Horizontal mismatch between employment and field of education: evidence from a systematic literature review (2019)
Zitatform
Somers, Melline A., Sofie J. Cabus, Wim Groot & Henriëtte Maassen van den Brink (2019): Horizontal mismatch between employment and field of education. Evidence from a systematic literature review. In: Journal of Economic Surveys, Jg. 33, H. 2, S. 597-603. DOI:10.1111/joes.12271
Abstract
"This paper provides a systematic review of the growing literature on the poor match between employees' field degree and the job requirements, also referred to as horizontal mismatch. We identify the different definitions used in the literature and find that each measure of horizontal mismatch yields substantially different incidence rates. We discuss the validity of the different measures and conclude that a more uniform definition of horizontal mismatch is needed. The likelihood of horizontal mismatch is among other things determined by the extent to which employees possess general skills as opposed to occupation-specific skills, and, it appears to be more frequently present among older workers. Compared to well-matched employees, horizontally mismatched workers generally incur a wage penalty, are less satisfied with their jobs, and are more likely to regret their study programme. The ensuing findings offer guidance to prevent horizontal mismatch as well as a roadmap for future research." (Author's abstract, Published by arrangement with John Wiley & Sons) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Soziologische Arbeitsmarkttheorien: Ein Überblick (2019)
Weingärtner, Simon;Zitatform
Weingärtner, Simon (2019): Soziologische Arbeitsmarkttheorien. Ein Überblick. (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft), Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 246 S. DOI:10.1007/978-3-658-23743-1
Abstract
"Die Arbeit stellt die erste Einführung und Übersicht zu soziologischen Arbeitsmarkttheorien im deutschsprachigen Raum vor und versucht einen Brückenschlag zwischen Wirtschafts- und Arbeitsmarktsoziologie. Anhand eines mehrdimensionalen Systematisierungskonzeptes werden arbeitsmarkttheoretische Erklärungsansätze aus verschiedenen sozialtheoretischen Forschungsrichtungen vorgestellt und anhand ihrer zentralen Aussagen und empirischen Schlussfolgerungen miteinander verglichen." (Verlagsangaben, © Springer)