matching – Suchprozesse am Arbeitsmarkt
Offene Stellen bei gleichzeitiger Arbeitslosigkeit - was Arbeitsmarkttheorien u. a. mit "unvollkommener Information" begründen, ist für Unternehmen und Arbeitsuchende oft nur schwer nachzuvollziehen: Unternehmen können freie Stellen nicht besetzen, trotzdem finden Arbeitsuchende nur schwer den passenden Job. Wie gestalten sich die Suchprozesse bei Unternehmen und Arbeitsuchenden, welche Konzessionen sind beide Seiten bereit einzugehen, wie lässt sich das "matching" verbessern?
Diese Infoplattform bietet wissenschaftliche Literatur zur theoretischen und empirischen Auseinandersetzung mit dem Thema.
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Literaturhinweis
The Potential of Recommender Systems for Directing Job Search: A Large-Scale Experiment (2024)
Behaghel, Luc; Hazard, Yagan; Gurgand, Marc; Dromundo, Sofia; Zuber, Thomas;Zitatform
Behaghel, Luc, Sofia Dromundo, Marc Gurgand, Yagan Hazard & Thomas Zuber (2024): The Potential of Recommender Systems for Directing Job Search: A Large-Scale Experiment. (IZA discussion paper / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 16781), Bonn, 65 S.
Abstract
"We analyze the employment effects of directing job seekers' applications toward establishments likely to recruit. We run a two-sided randomization design involving about 800,000 job seekers and 40,000 establishments, based on an empirical model that recommends each job seeker to firms so as to maximize total potential employment. Our intervention induces a 1% increase in job finding rates for short term contracts. This impact comes from a targeting effect combining (i) a modest increase in job seekers' applications to the very firms that were recommended to them, and (ii) a high success rate conditional on applying to these firms. Indeed, the success rate of job seekers' applications varies considerably across firms: the efficiency of applications sent to recommended firms is 2.7 times higher than the efficiency of applications to the average firm. This suggests that there can be substantial gains from better targeting job search, leveraging firm-level heterogeneity." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
The cyclicality of on-the-job search (2024)
Zitatform
Bransch, Felix, Samreen Malik & Benedikt Mihm (2024): The cyclicality of on-the-job search. In: Labour Economics, Jg. 87. DOI:10.1016/j.labeco.2024.102517
Abstract
"On-the-job search is increasingly recognized as an important potential driver of labor market dynamics over the business cycle. Using the UK Labor Force Survey, we find robust empirical evidence that on-the-job search is countercyclical and that the cyclical fluctuations have important repercussions for labor market dynamics. We also find that the cyclical pattern is not explained by precautionary search motives but rather appears to be driven by job-ladder-motivated searches. This finding is surprising because, as we confirm, the expected returns to on-the-job search are procyclical. We find evidence that three features of search behavior may contribute to this finding: greater search effort in response to lower job-to-job transition probabilities, a prevalence of non-pecuniary motivated searches that are less affected by lower expected wage gains, and procyclicality in average match quality, which has a significant impact on the search behavior of new hires over the business cycle." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, © 2024 Elsevier) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Risk and the allocation of talent in the Roy model (2024)
Zitatform
Cubas, German, Pedro Silos & Vesa Soini (2024): Risk and the allocation of talent in the Roy model. In: Economics Letters, Jg. 236. DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111623
Abstract
"With risk-averse workers and uninsurable earnings shocks, competitive markets allocate too few workers to risky jobs. Using an equilibrium Roy model with incomplete markets, we show that in competitive equilibrium, risky occupations are inefficiently small and hence talent is misallocated." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, © 2024 Elsevier) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Search, unemployment, and the Beveridge curve: Experimental evidence (2024)
Zitatform
Duffy, John & Brian C. Jenkins (2024): Search, unemployment, and the Beveridge curve: Experimental evidence. In: Labour Economics, Jg. 87. DOI:10.1016/j.labeco.2024.102518
Abstract
"We report on a laboratory experiment testing the predictions of the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides (DMP) search-and-matching model, which is a workhorse, decentralized model of unemployment and the labor market. We focus on the job vacancy posting problem that firms face in the DMP model. We explore the model’s comparative statics predictions concerning variations in the separation rate, the vacancy posting cost, and the firm’s surplus earned per employee. Across all treatments, we find strong evidence for an inverse relationship between vacancies and unemployment, consistent with the Beveridge curve. We also find that the results of our various comparative statics exercises are in-line with the predictions of the theory." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, © 2024 Elsevier) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Firm Productivity, Wages, and Sorting (2024)
Zitatform
Lochner, Benjamin & Bastian Schulz (2024): Firm Productivity, Wages, and Sorting. In: Journal of labor economics, Jg. 42, H. 1, S. 85-119., 2022-09-13. DOI:10.1086/722564
Abstract
"We study the link between firm productivity and the wages that firms pay. Guided by a search-matching model with large firms, worker and firm heterogeneity, and production complementarities, we infer firm productivity by estimating firm-level production functions. Using German data, we find that the most productive firms do not pay the highest wages. Worker transitions from high- to medium-productivity firms are on average associated with wage gains. Productivity sorting, that is, the sorting of high-ability workers into high-productivity firms, is less pronounced than the sorting into high-wage firms." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, © University of Chicago Press) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
What does job applicants' body art signal to employers? (2023)
Zitatform
Baert, Stijn, Jolien Herregods & Philippe Sterkens (2023): What does job applicants' body art signal to employers? (Working paper / Ghent University. Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 2023,1072), Gent, 30 S.
Abstract
"In this study, we present a state-of-the-art scenario experiment which, for the first time in the literature, directly measures the stigma surrounding job candidates with tattoos and piercings using real recruiters. We find that job candidates with body art are perceived as less pleasant to work with, less honest, less emotionally stable, less agreeable, less conscientious and less manageable. This goes hand in hand with lower hireability for men with body art but not for women. Compared to candidates who reveal obesity, a characteristic we also randomise, those with body art score better overall in terms of hireability and rated personality, similar in terms of rated taste to collaborate but worse in terms of rated direct productivity drivers." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
Ähnliche Treffer
auch erschienen als: IZA Discussion Papers, 16311 -
Literaturhinweis
The Shifting Reasons for Beveridge-Curve Shifts (2023)
Barlevy, Gadi; Şahin, Ayşegül; Faberman, Jason; Hobijn, Bart;Zitatform
Barlevy, Gadi, Bart Hobijn, Jason Faberman & Ayşegül Şahin (2023): The Shifting Reasons for Beveridge-Curve Shifts. (IZA discussion paper / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 16517), Bonn, 29 S.
Abstract
"We discuss how the relative importance of factors that contribute to movements of the U.S. Beveridge curve has changed from 1960 to 2023. We review these factors in the context of a simple flow analogy used to capture the main insights of search and matching theories of the labor market. Changes in inflow rates, related to demographics, accounted for Beveridge curve shifts between 1960 and 2000. A reduction in matching efficiency, that depressed unemployment outflows, shifted the curve outwards in the wake of the Great Recession. In contrast, the most recent shifts in the Beveridge curve appear driven by changes in the eagerness of workers to switch jobs. We argue that, while the Beveridge curve is a useful tool for relating unemployment and vacancies to inflation, the link between these labor market indicators and inflation depends on whether and why the Beveridge curve shifted. Therefore, a careful examination of the factors underlying movements in the Beveridge curve is essential for drawing policy conclusions from the joint behavior of unemployment and job openings." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Vacancy duration and wages (2023)
Zitatform
Bassier, Ihsaan, Alan Manning & Barbara Petrongolo (2023): Vacancy duration and wages. (CEP discussion paper / Centre for Economic Performance 1943), London, 45 S.
Abstract
"We estimate the elasticity of vacancy duration with respect to posted wages, using data from the near-universe of online job adverts in the United Kingdom. Our research design identifies duration elasticities by leveraging firm-level wage policies that are plausibly exogenous to hiring difficulties on specific job vacancies, and control for job and market-level fixed-effects. Wage policies are defined based on external information on pay settlements, or on sharp, internally-defined, firm-level changes. In our preferred specifications, we estimate duration elasticities in the range −3 to −5, which are substantially larger than the few existing estimates." (Résumé d'auteur, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
The right person for the right job: workers’ prosociality as a screening device (2023)
Zitatform
Bigoni, Maria, Matteo Ploner & Thi-Thanh-Tam Vu (2023): The right person for the right job: workers’ prosociality as a screening device. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Jg. 212, S. 53-73. DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2023.04.013
Abstract
"The impact of workers’ non-pecuniary motivation on their productivity is a fundamental issue in labor economics. Previous studies indicate that prosocially motivated workers may perform better when assigned to jobs having socially desirable implications – even if effort is non-contractible and they are offered a low-powered fixed-compensation scheme – as compared to a standard job with an effort-contingent payment. This suggests that profit-maximizing employers should assign workers to different jobs, based on workers’ prosociality. We run an experiment to explore the link between workers’ prosociality and their level of effort under a prosocial and a standard job. Our experimental results provide some support to the hypothesis that selfish employers exploit the information on workers’ prosociality to assign them the type of job that would be most profitable from the firm’s perspective. However, the prosocial motivation of employers emerges as a second important determinant of their contract choice: employers’ prosociality drives their contract choice, when the worker is not prosocial." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, © 2023 Elsevier) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Labor economics (2023)
Borjas, George J.;Zitatform
Borjas, George J. (2023): Labor economics. New York: MacGraw-Hill, 494 S.
Abstract
"Labor Economics, ninth edition by George J. Borjas provides a modern introduction to labor economics, surveying the field with an emphasis on both theory and facts. Labor Economics is thoroughly integrated with the adaptive digital tools available in McGraw-Hill’s Connect, proven to increase student engagement and success in the course. All new Data Explorer questions using data simulation to help students grasp concepts Materials are fresh and up to date by introducing and discussing the latest research studies where conceptual or empirical contributions have increased our understanding of the labor market. The book has undergone Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion reviews to implement content around topics including generalizations and stereotypes, gender, abilities/disabilities, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, diversity of names, and age." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Labor Demand on a Tight Leash (2023)
Zitatform
Bossler, Mario & Martin Popp (2023): Labor Demand on a Tight Leash. (LASER discussion papers 143), Erlangen, 77 S. DOI:10.48720/IAB.DP.2302
Abstract
"In diesem Aufsatz stellen wir ein Arbeitsnachfrage-Modell auf, das Einstellungskosten berücksichtigt, die aufgrund eines angespannten Arbeitsmarktes bei der Besetzung offener Stellen anfallen. Darauf aufbauend schätzen wir den Effekt der Arbeitsmarktanspannung auf die betriebliche Arbeitsnachfrage, indem wir neuartige Bartik-Instrumente sowie administrative Beschäftigungsdaten für Deutschland heranziehen. Im Einklang mit der Theorie deuten die IV-Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass ein zehnprozentiger Anstieg der Arbeitsmarktanspannung die betriebliche Beschäftigung um rund 0,5 Prozent reduziert. Außerdem zeigt sich, dass die betriebliche Lohnelastizität der Arbeitsnachfrage durch Einbeziehung von Suchexternalitäten auf der aggregierten Ebene von -0,7 auf -0,5 sinkt. In Bezug auf die Einführung des gesetzlichen Mindestlohns im Jahr 2015 implizieren die Elastizitäten nur geringfügig negative Beschäftigungseffekte, was die Ergebnisse empirischer Ex-Post-Evaluationen widerspiegelt. Darüber hinaus führte die Verdoppelung der Arbeitsmarktanspannung in Deutschland zwischen 2012 und 2019 zu einer Verringerung des Beschäftigungswachstums um rund 1,1 Millionen Arbeitsplätze." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)
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Literaturhinweis
Matching Through Search Channels (2023)
Zitatform
Carillo-Tudela, Carlos, Leo Kaas & Benjamin Lochner (2023): Matching Through Search Channels. (IAB-Discussion Paper 10/2023), Nürnberg, 85 S. DOI:10.48720/IAB.DP.2310
Abstract
"Firmen und Arbeitnehmer/-innen finden überwiegend über Stellenanzeigen, persönliche Kontaktnetzwerke oder die Bundesagentur für Arbeit zueinander. All diese Suchkanäle tragen dazu bei, Friktionen am Arbeitsmarkt zu verringern. In diesem Papier untersuchen wir, inwieweit diese Suchkanäle unterschiedliche Auswirkungen auf den Arbeitsmarkt haben. Anhand einer neuen Datenverknüpfung aus administrativer Daten und Umfragedaten zeigen wir: (i) Niedriglohnfirmen und Niedriglohnbeziehende finden vermehrt über Netzwerke oder die Bundesagentur für Arbeit zueinander, währendessen Hochlohnfirmen und Hochlohnbeziehende häufiger über Stellenanzeigen zusammenkommen. (ii) Dabei nutzen Firmen Stellenanzeigen vor allem bei der Abwerbung und Gewinnung von Hochlohnbeziehenden. Im Vergleich zu anderen Suchkanälen, werden Stellenanzeigen auch vermehrt von Beschäftigten beim Aufstieg auf der Karriereleiter genutzt. Um die Auswirkungen dieser Beobachtungen auf die aggregierte Beschäftigung, die Löhne und die Arbeitsmarktsortierung zu bewerten, schätzen wir strukturell ein Gleichgewichtsmodell, das sich durch Karriereleitern, zweiseitige Heterogenität, mehrere Suchkanäle und endogene Einstellungsintensität auszeichnet. Die Schätzung zeigt, dass Netzwerke der kosteneffizienteste Kanal sind, der es Firmen ermöglicht, schnell einzustellen, aber auch Arbeitskräfte mit geringeren durchschnittlichen Fähigkeiten anzuziehen. Stellenanzeigen sind der kostspieligste Kanal, erleichtern die Einstellung von Arbeitnehmern/-innen mit höheren Fähigkeiten und sind für die Sortierung zwischen Beschäftigten und Firmen am wichtigsten. In kontrafaktischen Berechnungen zeigt sich, dass obwohl die Bundesagentur für Arbeit die geringste Einstellungswahrscheinlichkeit bietet, ihre hypothetische Abschaffung beträchtliche Folgen hätte. Die Gesamtbeschäftigung würde um mindestens 1,4 Prozent sinken und die Lohnungleichheit steigen." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)
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Literaturhinweis
Recruitment Policies, Job-Filling Rates and Matching Efficiency (2023)
Zitatform
Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos, Hermann Gartner & Leo Kaas (2023): Recruitment Policies, Job-Filling Rates and Matching Efficiency. In: Journal of the European Economic Association, Jg. 21, H. 6, S. 2413-2459., 2023-01-09. DOI:10.1093/jeea/jvad034
Abstract
"Recruitment intensity is important for the matching process in the labor market. Using unique linked survey-administrative data, we investigate the relationships between hiring and recruitment policies at the establishment level. Faster hiring goes along with higher search effort, lower hiring standards and more generous wages. We develop a directed search model that links these patterns to the employment adjustments of heterogenous firms. The model provides a novel structural decomposition of the matching function that we use to evaluate the relative importance of these recruitment policies at the aggregate level. The calibrated model shows that hiring standards play an important role in explaining differences in matching efficiency across labor markets defined as region/skill cross products and for the impact of labor market policy, whereas search effort and wage policies play only a minor role." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Active and passive labor-market policies: the outlook from the Beveridge curve (2023)
Zitatform
Destefanis, Sergio, Matteo Fragetta & Nazzareno Ruggiero (2023): Active and passive labor-market policies: the outlook from the Beveridge curve. In: Applied Economics, Jg. 55, H. 55, S. 6538-6550. DOI:10.1080/00036846.2022.2159010
Abstract
"Following a panel ARDL approach, we appraise the impact of various indicators of active and passive labor-market policies within the framework of the Beveridge curve across fourteen OECD countries from 1985 to 2013, controlling for other factors, both institutional (tax wedge) and structural (technological progress, globalization). We embed the role of these variables within the specification of the Beveridge curve, finding that the generosity of unemployment benefits has a detrimental impact on labor-market matching, with the duration of benefits and the strictness of the rules pertaining to the deployment of benefits taking a key role in driving this result. Among active labor-market policies, employment incentives and especially training have a favourable effect on matching. There is evidence of a virtuous interaction between active and passive policies. A significantly detrimental role emerges for the tax wedge. These results are consistent across various specifications, and structural relationships are stable throughout the 2008–2013 period." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Inefficient Labor Market Sorting (2023)
Eckel, Carsten; Yeaple, Stephen R.;Zitatform
Eckel, Carsten & Stephen R. Yeaple (2023): Inefficient Labor Market Sorting. (Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CCR TRR 190 437), München ; Berlin, 47 S.
Abstract
"A growing empirical literature attributes much of the productivity advantages of large, "superstar" firms to their adoption of best practice management techniques that allow them to better identify and use talented workers. The reasons for the incomplete adoption of these "structured management practices" and their welfare implications are not well understood. This paper provides a positive and normative analysis of these issues in a theoretical framework in which structured management practices induce sorting of talent across firms. Incomplete adoption arises because worker talent is in limited supply. In equilibrium there is excessive adoption of structured management practices and too much sorting of talented workers into large firms. In this second-best environment, policy changes that favor large firms, such as trade liberalization, have the potential to lower welfare." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Jobseekers’ Beliefs about Comparative Advantage and (Mis)Directed Search (2023)
Kiss, Andrea; Garlick, Robert; Orkin, Kate; Hensel, Lukas;Zitatform
Kiss, Andrea, Robert Garlick, Kate Orkin & Lukas Hensel (2023): Jobseekers’ Beliefs about Comparative Advantage and (Mis)Directed Search. (Upjohn Institute working paper 388), Kalamazoo, Mich., 99 S. DOI:10.17848/wp23-388
Abstract
"Worker sorting into tasks and occupations has long been recognized as an important feature of labor markets. But this sorting may be inefficient if jobseekers have inaccurate beliefs about their skills and therefore apply to jobs that do not match their skills. To test this idea, we measure young South African jobseekers’ communication and numeracy skills and their beliefs about their skill levels. Many jobseekers believe they are better at the skill in which they score lower, relative to other jobseekers. These beliefs predict the skill requirements of jobs where they apply. In two field experiments, giving jobseekers their skill assessment results shifts their beliefs toward their assessment results. It also redirects their search toward jobs that value the skill in which they score relatively higher—using measures from administrative, incentivized task, and survey data—but does not increase total search effort. It also raises earnings and job quality, consistent with inefficient sorting due to limited information." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Ranking and search effort in matching (2023)
Zitatform
Lee, Joonbae & Hanna Wang (2023): Ranking and search effort in matching. In: Economic Theory, Jg. 75, H. 1, S. 113-136. DOI:10.1007/s00199-021-01391-4
Abstract
"This paper studies the relationship between search effort and workers’ ranking by employers. In order to do so, we propose a matching model in which employers have common preferences over a continuum of heterogeneous workers who choose a number of applications to send out. We show that in equilibrium, the relationship is hump-shaped for sufficiently high vacancy-to-worker ratios, that is, highly-ranked and lowly-ranked workers send out fewer applications than workers of mid-range rank. This arises due to two opposing forces driving the incentives of applicants. Increasing the number of applications acts as insurance against unemployment, but is less effective when the probability of success for each application is low. This mechanism exacerbates the negative employment outcomes of low-rank workers—hence, in contrast to the market equilibrium, in the social planner’s solution, the number of applications monotonically decrease in rank." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
The Macroeconomics of Skills Mismatch in the Presence of Emigration (2023)
Liontos, George; Vella, Eugenia; Mavrigiannakis, Konstantinos;Zitatform
Liontos, George, Konstantinos Mavrigiannakis & Eugenia Vella (2023): The Macroeconomics of Skills Mismatch in the Presence of Emigration. (Working paper series / Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies 2023-14), Athen, 52 S.
Abstract
"Employment in mismatch (low-skill) jobs is a potential factor in the emigration of highly qualified workers. At the same time, high-skilled emigration and emigration of mismatch workers can free up positions for stayers. In bad times, it could also amplify demand losses and the unemployment spell, which in turn affects the mismatch rate. In this paper, we investigate the link between vertical skills mismatch and emigration of both non-mismatch and mismatch workers in a DSGE model. The model features also skill and wealth heterogeneous households, capital-skill complementarity (CSC) and labor frictions. We find that an adverse productivity shock reduces investment and primarily hurts the high-skilled who react by turning to both jobs abroad and mismatch jobs in the domestic labor market. A negative shock to government spending crowds-in investment and primarily hurts the low-skilled who thus turn to jobs abroad. Following the fiscal cut, the high-skilled instead reduce their search for mismatch employment and later they also reduce their search for jobs abroad." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Making the invisible hand visible: Managers and the allocation of workers to jobs (2023)
Minni, Virginia;Zitatform
Minni, Virginia (2023): Making the invisible hand visible: Managers and the allocation of workers to jobs. (CEP discussion paper / Centre for Economic Performance 1948), London, 80 S.
Abstract
"Why do managers matter for firm performance? This paper provides evidence of the critical role of managers in matching workers to jobs within the firm using the universe of personnel records from a large multinational firm. The data covers 200,000 white-collar workers and 30,000 managers over 10 years in 100 countries. I identify good managers as the top 30% by their speed of promotion and leverage exogenous variation induced by the rotation of managers across teams. I find that good managers cause workers to reallocate within the firm through lateral and vertical transfers. This leads to large and persistent gains in workers' career progression and productivity. Seven years after the manager transition, workers earn 30% more and perform better on objective performance measures. In terms of aggregate firm productivity, doubling the share of good managers would increase output per worker by 61% at the establishment level. My results imply that the visible hands of managers match workers' specific skills to specialized jobs, leading to an improvement in the productivity of existing workers that outlasts the managers' time at the firm." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Why Personal Ties (Still) Matter: Referrals and Congestion (2023)
Mylius, F.;Zitatform
Mylius, F. (2023): Why Personal Ties (Still) Matter: Referrals and Congestion. (Cambridge working papers in economics 2356), Cambridge, 21 S.
Abstract
"The internet has reduced search costs significantly, making it much easier to apply for a large number of jobs. In spite of that, the share of jobs found through personal contacts has remained stable over the past decades. My theoretical framework explores a new channel that makes referred candidates favorable for firms: a higher likelihood to accept a job offer. This trait becomes particularly advantageous whenever firms face large uncertainty over whether their candidates would accept their job offer. As we see, if search barriers vanish and workers apply to more firms, a referred candidate expects to face more competitors. On the other hand, with more applications being sent out, workers are, on average, less interested in each firm they apply to, which makes referred candidates stand out more. This means the chances of getting a job offer through a referral can increase if competing workers send out more applications." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))