Beschreibung

"In our recent NBER working paper, Labor in the Boardroom (Jäger, Schoefer and Heining, 2019), we exploit a natural experiment in Germany to provide empirical evidence on the effects of shared governance. We study a 1994 reform in Germany. This reform sharply abolished worker-elected directors in certain new firms and permanently preserved the mandate in others. Before the law change, all stock corporations (Aktiengesellschaften and Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien, which can but usually are not listed) had to apportion at least one third of their supervisory board seats to representatives elected by their workforce. In dual board settings such as Germany’s, the supervisory board appoints, monitors, dismisses, and sets the compensation for the executive board. It is also involved in important decisions, such as large investments." (Text excerpt, IAB-Doku) ((en))