Anschubhilfe für Arbeitslose: Internationale Erfahrungen aus den letzten Jahrzehnten
Im Oktober 2024 machte die „Anschubprämie“ von sich reden, ein Vorschlag zur Arbeitslosigkeitsbekämpfung mittels eines starken positiven Anreizes für den Übergang in sozialversicherungspflichtige Jobs. Die Idee: 1.000 Euro für Bürgergeld-beziehende Langzeitarbeitslose, die einen Job annehmen und ein Jahr lang in diesem verbleiben.
Was im Rahmen der Wachstumsinitiative vom Bundeskabinett beschlossen, dann Gegenstand einer polarisierten Debatte wurde und angesichts der vorgezogenen Neuwahl 2025 wohl doch nicht kommen wird, ist andernorts zumindest ausprobiert worden – vor allem in den USA der 1980er Jahre in Form sogenannter „reemployment boni“.
Die in unserem Themendossier gesammelten Literaturhinweise und externen Links zeichnen solche früheren Anreiz-Experimente sowie die aktuelle Debatte nach. Mit dem Filter „Autorenschaft“ können Sie auf IAB-(Mit-)Autorenschaft eingrenzen.
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Literaturhinweis
Do Reemployment Bonuses Increase Employment? Evidence from the Idaho Return to Work Bonus Program (2024)
Hobbs, Duncan; Strain, Michael R.;Zitatform
Hobbs, Duncan & Michael R. Strain (2024): Do Reemployment Bonuses Increase Employment? Evidence from the Idaho Return to Work Bonus Program. (IZA discussion paper / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 16924), Bonn, 58 S.
Abstract
"In June 2020, Idaho announced the Return to Work Bonus program, which provided residents who returned to work with bonuses of up to $1,500. Using multiple data sources, we present difference-in-differences, triple differences, and synthetic control estimates suggesting the program may have increased individual employment and accelerated flows into employment from unemployment and from nonparticipation in the labor force. We show the program likely increased state-level employment rates. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study the effects of reemployment bonuses on the U.S. labor market outside an experimental setting." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
The Welfare Impact of Reemployment Bonuses (2024)
Komatsu, Katsuhiro;Zitatform
Komatsu, Katsuhiro (2024): The Welfare Impact of Reemployment Bonuses. (SSRN papers), Rochester, NY, 39 S. DOI:10.2139/ssrn.4534315
Abstract
"This paper investigates the welfare impact of reemployment bonuses in a dynamic job search model. Reemployment bonuses, monetary incentives offered to workers who obtain employment, may mitigate the moral hazard in unemployment insurance (UI) while preserving consumption smoothing. Using a sufficient statistics approach, I first show the substantial positive impact of reemployment bonuses on welfare given the current level of UI benefits. Then, by using a quantitative model of job search, consumption, and saving, I study the optimal combination of UI benefits and reemployment bonuses. I find that the optimal UI benefit level is higher when reemployment bonuses are incorporated. Compared to the welfare gain achieved by implementing only the optimal level of UI benefits, the optimal combination of UI benefits and reemployment bonuses achieves a 56 percent larger welfare gain." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Eine Anschubhilfe im Bürgergeld könnte die Erwerbsanreize erheblich stärken (IAB-Debattenbeiträge) (2024)
Zitatform
Weber, Enzo (2024): Eine Anschubhilfe im Bürgergeld könnte die Erwerbsanreize erheblich stärken (IAB-Debattenbeiträge). In: IAB-Forum H. 26.06.2024 Nürnberg. DOI:10.48720/IAB.FOO.20240626.01
Abstract
"Es mutet an wie die Quadratur des Kreises: Spürbar bessere Anreize zu setzen, den Bezug von Bürgergeld zu verlassen, ohne zugleich die Kosten dafür völlig aus dem Ruder laufen zu lassen. Einen möglichen Ausweg aus diesem Dilemma böte eine finanzielle Anschubhilfe, wenn Erwerbseinkommen ausgeweitet wird. Dafür gibt es verschiedene Varianten, etwa über die Einkommensanrechnung." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)
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Literaturhinweis
Nonparametric Instrumental Regression With Right Censored Duration Outcomes (2022)
Beyhum, Jad; Florens, Jean-Pierre; Keilegom, Ingrid Van;Zitatform
Beyhum, Jad, Jean-Pierre Florens & Ingrid Van Keilegom (2022): Nonparametric Instrumental Regression With Right Censored Duration Outcomes. In: Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Jg. 40, H. 3, S. 1034-1045. DOI:10.1080/07350015.2021.1895814
Abstract
"This article analyzes the effect of a discrete treatment Z on a duration T. The treatment is not randomly assigned. The confounding issue is treated using a discrete instrumental variable explaining the treatment and independent of the error term of the model. Our framework is nonparametric and allows for random right censoring. This specification generates a nonlinear inverse problem and the average treatment effect is derived from its solution. We provide local and global identification properties that rely on a nonlinear system of equations. We propose an estimation procedure to solve this system and derive rates of convergence and conditions under which the estimator is asymptotically normal. When censoring makes identification fail, we develop partial identification results. Our estimators exhibit good finite sample properties in simulations. We also apply our methodology to the Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiment." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
The welfare effects of extending unemployment benefits: Evidence from re-employment and unemployment transfers (2021)
Zitatform
Huang, Po-Chun & Tzu-Ting Yang (2021): The welfare effects of extending unemployment benefits: Evidence from re-employment and unemployment transfers. In: Journal of Public Economics, Jg. 202. DOI:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104500
Abstract
"This paper investigates the welfare effects of extending unemployment benefits by comparing the search effort responses to income transfers when employed (i.e. re-employment bonus) and unemployed (i.e. extended benefits). Specifically, we use administrative data on the universe of unemployment spells in Taiwan from 2001 to 2011 and evaluate effects of providing a re-employment bonus and extending unemployment benefits. Our results suggest that the provision of re-employment bonus increases job-finding hazards and results in the positive fiscal externality. The behavioral costs per New Taiwanese Dollar (NTD) of initial spending on bonuses is . In contrast, extending unemployment benefits reduces the rate of unemployment exit and generates the negative fiscal externality. We integrate the estimated policy effects with a search model with liquidity constraints to identify the value of extending unemployment benefits captured by the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption when unemployed and employed. We find that the estimated MRS of extending benefits is around 1.5 to 2.5 — the marginal value of transfers when unemployed is about two times larger than that when employed. Finally, the marginal value of public fund for extending UI benefits is between 1.3 and 2, suggesting the welfare gain from benefit extension is larger than its welfare cost by more than 30%." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, ©2021 Elsevier) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Optimal unemployment benefits in the pandemic (2020)
Mitman, Kurt; Rabinovich, Stanislav;Zitatform
Mitman, Kurt & Stanislav Rabinovich (2020): Optimal unemployment benefits in the pandemic. In: Covid economics H. 31, S. 187-201.
Abstract
"How should unemployment benefits vary in response to the economic crisis induced by the COVID-19 pandemic? We answer this question by computing the optimal unemployment insurance response to the COVIDinduced recession. We compare the optimal policy to the provisions under the CARES Act-which substantially expanded unemployment insurance and sparked an ongoing debate over further increases-and several alternative scenarios. We find that it is optimal first to raise unemployment benefits but then to begin lowering them as the economy starts to reopen - despite unemployment remaining high. We also find that the $600 UI supplement payment implemented under CARES was close to the optimal policy. Extending this UI supplement for another six months would hamper the recovery and reduce welfare. On the other hand, a UI extension combined with a re-employment bonus would further increase welfare compared to CARES alone, with only minimal effects on unemployment." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
Weiterführende Informationen
Link zum gesamten Heft -
Literaturhinweis
The Effects of an Employment Bonus for Long-Term Social Assistance Recipients (2019)
Zitatform
Arendt, Jacob Nielsen & Christophe Kolodziejczyk (2019): The Effects of an Employment Bonus for Long-Term Social Assistance Recipients. In: Journal of labor research, Jg. 40, H. 4, S. 412-427. DOI:10.1007/s12122-019-09290-3
Abstract
"This study uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate effects of an employment bonus program for long-term unemployed social assistance recipients. The program pays benefit bonuses to persons in the target group for any hours they work in regular employment or subsidized employment schemes. The program pays up to 6 % of post-tax earnings if they enter regular or subsidized employment over a specific two-year period. Our results show that the program has no effects on employment rates, earnings or participation in subsidized employment. The null findings are robust when using RD estimates based on different bandwidths and different window widths around the eligibility threshold and hold for given gender, age, ethnicity and parental status." (Author's Abstract, IAB-Doku)
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Literaturhinweis
Structural empirical evaluation of job search monitoring (2019)
van den Berg, Gerard J.; Klaauw, Bas van der;Zitatform
van den Berg, Gerard J. & Bas van der Klaauw (2019): Structural empirical evaluation of job search monitoring. In: International Economic Review, Jg. 60, H. 2, S. 879-903. DOI:10.1111/iere.12376
Abstract
"To evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers, it is important to take account of post-unemployment wages and job-to-job mobility. We structurally estimate a model with search channels, using an RCT in which monitoring is randomized. The data include registers and survey data on search behavior. We find that the opportunity to move to better-paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution towards formal search channels in unemployment. Job mobility compensates for adverse long-run effects of monitoring on wages. We examine counterfactual policies against moral hazard, like reemployment bonuses and changes of the benefits path." (Author's abstract, Published by arrangement with John Wiley & Sons) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Assessing the effects of reemployment bonuses on job search: A regression discontinuity approach (2018)
Zitatform
Ahn, Taehyun (2018): Assessing the effects of reemployment bonuses on job search: A regression discontinuity approach. In: Journal of Public Economics, Jg. 165, S. 82-100. DOI:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.07.003
Abstract
"This study examines the impacts of reemployment bonuses, that is, the incentive payments to unemployment insurance (UI) recipients who find a job within a specified period, using Korean data. A sharp discontinuity in treatment assignment at age 55 identifies the effect of increased reemployment bonuses on unemployment duration and on subsequent job duration. The results indicate that increases in the reemployment bonus boost the job-finding hazards of UI claimants early in their unemployment spells during the bonus qualification period and significantly shorten the duration of UI spells by 0.16 to 0.42 months (0.68 to 1.82 weeks). In addition, employment stability is not significantly affected by an increased bonus, which implies no negative influence of the bonus on subsequent job match quality. The simulated estimates show that the increase in tax revenue and the decrease in UI benefit payment caused by the behavioral response of UI recipients are large enough to offset the increased cost of the reemployment bonus." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, © 2018 Elsevier) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Lessons Learned from Public Workforce Program Experiments (2017)
Wandner, Stephen A.;Zitatform
(2017): Lessons Learned from Public Workforce Program Experiments. (WE focus series), Kalamazoo: Upjohn Press, 125 S. DOI:10.17848/9780880996310
Abstract
"This book chronicles many of the most important experiments and the key lessons derived from the evaluations of both existing large-scale public workforce programs and the development of new interventions—including low-cost experiments based on behavioral science methods." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Financial incentives to return to work: a comparison between Germany and France (2015)
Reysz, Julien;Zitatform
Reysz, Julien (2015): Financial incentives to return to work: a comparison between Germany and France. Grenoble, 11 S.
Abstract
"European welfare states have developed instruments to ensure the reintegration of the excluded from the labour market (and the job retention of the employees). These instruments developed for the recipients receiving unemployment insurance benefits and for the welfare recipients (only for those who are able to work) have concerned two levels. In terms of financing of social policies, resources come from increasing taxation (social public expenditures are more financed by the tax and less by the social contributions). In terms of targeted people, these instruments have mainly consisted of financial incentives to return to work. Incentives to work can be positive incentives (opportunities and orientation of individuals’ behaviours) or negative incentives (obligations and sanctions); but only the first ones, based on the logic of monetary motivation to work, can be seen as financial incentives." (Text excerpt, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Carrot and stick: How re-employment bonuses and benefit sanctions affect exit rates from welfare (2013)
Klaauw, Bas van der; Ours, Jan C. van;Zitatform
Klaauw, Bas van der & Jan C. van Ours (2013): Carrot and stick: How re-employment bonuses and benefit sanctions affect exit rates from welfare. In: Journal of Applied Econometrics, Jg. 28, H. 2, S. 275-296. DOI:10.1002/jae.1265
Abstract
"To increase the exit from welfare, benefit recipients in the municipality of Rotterdam were exposed to various financial incentives. Once their benefit spell exceeded one year, welfare recipients were entitled to a re-employment bonus if they found a job that lasted at least 6?months. However, they could also be punished for noncompliance with eligibility requirements and face a sanction, i.e. a temporary reduction of their benefits. We find that the financial sticks in the form of benefit sanctions were effective in stimulating the exit from welfare, while the financial carrots in the form of re-employment bonuses were not." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Treatment effect analysis of early reemployment bonus program: panel MLE and mode-based semiparametric estimator for interval truncation (2012)
Kim, Hyun Ah; Kim, Yong-seong; Lee, Myoung-jae;Zitatform
Kim, Hyun Ah, Yong-seong Kim & Myoung-jae Lee (2012): Treatment effect analysis of early reemployment bonus program. Panel MLE and mode-based semiparametric estimator for interval truncation. In: Portuguese Economic Journal, Jg. 11, H. 3, S. 189-209. DOI:10.1007/s10258-012-0084-5
Abstract
"We use Korean data to find the effects of Early Reemployment Bonus (ERB) on unemployment duration; ERB is a bonus that the eligible unemployed receive if they find a job before their unemployment insurance benefit expires. A naive approach would be comparing the ERB receiving group with the non-receiving group, but the ERB receipt is partly determined by the unemployment duration itself (thus, an endogeneity problem). Interestingly, there were many individuals who did not receive the ERB despite being fully eligible, and this is attributed to being unaware of the ERB scheme. Taking this as a 'pseudo randomization', we construct treatment and control groups using only the eligible. Our data set is an unbalanced panel with the response variable interval-truncated due to eligibility requirement of the ERB. We propose a panel random-effect MLE and a semi-parametric 'mode-based' estimator for the interval-truncated response. Our empirical finding is that the effect varies much, depending on individual characteristics. As for the mean effects, whereas the MLE indicates large duration-shortening effects, the semi-parametric estimator shows much weaker and mostly insignificant effects." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Carrot and stick: How reemployment bonuses and benefit sanctions affect job finding rates (2010)
Klaauw, Bas van der; Ours, Jan C. van;Zitatform
Klaauw, Bas van der & Jan C. van Ours (2010): Carrot and stick: How reemployment bonuses and benefit sanctions affect job finding rates. (IZA discussion paper 5055), Bonn, 31 S.
Abstract
"To increase their transition from welfare to work, benefit recipients in the municipality of Rotterdam were exposed to various financial incentives, including both carrots to sticks. Once their benefit spell exceeded one year, welfare recipients were entitled to a reemployment bonus if they found a job that lasted at least six months. However, they could also be punished for noncompliance with eligibility requirements and face a sanction, i.e. a temporary reducing of their benefits. In this paper we investigate how benefit sanctions and reemployment bonuses affect job finding rates of welfare recipients. We find that benefit sanctions were effective in bringing unemployed from welfare to work more quickly while reemployment bonuses were not." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Solving the reemployment puzzle: from research to policy (2010)
Wandner, Stephen A.; Corson, Walter; Messenger, Jon; Balducchi, David E.;Zitatform
Wandner, Stephen A. (2010): Solving the reemployment puzzle. From research to policy. Kalamazoo: Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 507 S.
Abstract
"This book provides a detailed insider's view under the Clinton and Bush administrations of the process by which eight social science experiments influenced federal laws and policies to alleviate joblessness in the United States. These experiments, each of which focused on returning unemployed workers to work, are analyzed through their entire policy process: experiment initiation, implementation, and evaluation; policy development; legislative enactment; program development; and program implementation. Stephen Wandner also reveals that such rigorous scientific research can, but sometimes doesn't, influence federal workforce policy and legislation. For research to affect public policy, political leaders must commit to funding, conducting, and using research. Implementing research findings requires that government officials at the national, state, and local levels be supportive of the research results and use them to develop new and innovative programs and processes. When policymakers use research results as a prominent ingredient in policymaking, they are more likely to develop cost-effective policy that works. However, when the impartial research is not conducted or the research results are ignored or misused, policy, programs, and ultimately workers suffer." (author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Arbeitsanreize im Niedriglohnbereich - ein ausgewählter internationaler Vergleich. Gutachten (2006)
Kaltenborn, Bruno; Böttcher, Carina; Knerr, Petra; Heller, Dominik; Gabrielli, Bianca; Maier, Anne;Zitatform
Kaltenborn, Bruno & Petra Knerr (2006): Arbeitsanreize im Niedriglohnbereich - ein ausgewählter internationaler Vergleich. Gutachten. (Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung und Politikberatung 30), Berlin, 232 S.
Abstract
"In Deutschland werden ebenso wie in anderen westlichen Industrieländern Strategien zur Ausweitung der als unzureichend erachteten Beschäftigung von Personen mit geringem Verdienstpotenzial diskutiert. Eine Beschäftigung setzt insbesondere ein entsprechendes Arbeitsangebot eines Arbeitnehmers, eine dazu passende Arbeitsnachfrage eines Unternehmens und die Kenntnis beider voneinander voraus. Entsprechend gibt es mehrere Ansatzpunkte für Strategien zur Ausweitung der Beschäftigung. Derartige Strategien werden unter anderem für den Niedriglohnbereich diskutiert und auch bereits verfolgt. Die Strategien lassen sich einerseits nach ihrem Ansatzpunkt (Arbeitsangebot von Arbeitnehmern, Arbeitsnachfrage von Unternehmen sowie Matching von Arbeitsangebot und -nachfrage) und andererseits nach der Leistungsart (Geldleistungen, Sach- und Dienstleistungen, Rahmenbedingungen) klassifizieren.
Die nähere Betrachtung erfolgt unter zwei Gesichtspunkten:
- Einerseits erfolgt eine detaillierte Betrachtung einzelner ausländischer Steuer-Transfer- Systeme, um Gestaltungsoptionen aufzuzeigen (Kapitel 2). Dies ist angesichts des Aufwandes nur für einzelne Länder möglich. Für die notwendigen Details der jeweiligen Steuer-Transfer-Systeme am aktuellen Rand ist in der Regel eine Auswertung nationaler Quellen in der jeweiligen Landessprache erforderlich. Insgesamt wurden hierfür fünf Staaten ausgewählt (Italien, Frankreich, Großbritannien, Irland und die USA).
- Andererseits ist das Resultat des komplexen Zusammenspiels der Steuer-Transfer- Systeme unterschiedlicher Länder hinsichtlich der Anreize im Niedriglohnbereich von Interesse (Kapitel 3). Für eine derartige Betrachtung ist ebenfalls eine detaillierte Auswertung der jeweiligen Steuer-Transfer-Systeme erforderlich. Da hier auf Vorarbeiten der OECD zurückgegriffen werden kann, können über die fünf bereits in Kapitel 2 betrachteten Staaten hinaus weitere in die Analyse einbezogen werden. Insgesamt werden 15 westliche Industrieländer berücksichtigt." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku) -
Literaturhinweis
Cost-effectiveness of targeted reemployment bonuses (2005)
Zitatform
O'Leary, Christopher J., Paul T. Decker & Stephen A. Wandner (2005): Cost-effectiveness of targeted reemployment bonuses. In: The Journal of Human Resources, Jg. 40, H. 1, S. 270-279. DOI:10.3368/jhr.XL.1.270
Abstract
"Targeting reemployment bonus offers to unemployment insurance (UI) claimants identified as most likely to exhaust benefits is estimated to reduce benefit payments. We show that targeting bonus offers with profiling models similar to those in state Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services systems can improve cost effectiveness. Since estimated average benefit payments do not steadily decline as the eligibility screen is gradually tightened, we find that narrow targeting is not optimal. The best candidate is a low bonus amount with a long qualification period, targeted to the half of profiled claimants most likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Personal reemployment accounts: simulations for planning implementation (2004)
Zitatform
O'Leary, Christopher J. & Randall W. Eberts (2004): Personal reemployment accounts. Simulations for planning implementation. (Upjohn Institute staff working paper 2004-110), Kalamazoo, 64 S.
Abstract
"The proposed Back to Work Incentive Act of 2003 recommended personal reemployment accounts (PRAs) that would provide each eligible unemployment insurance (UI) claimant with a special account of up to $3,000 to finance reemployment activities. Account funds could be used to purchase intensive, supportive, and job training services. Any funds remaining in the PRA could be paid as a cash bonus for reemployment within 13 weeks, or drawn as extended income maintenance for exhaustees of regular UI benefits. Personal reemployment account offers would be targeted to UI beneficiaries most likely to exhaust their UI entitlements using state Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) models. The draft legislation called for a budget of $3.6 billion for PRAs, with the money to be committed over a two-year period. This report provides a simulation analysis of questions relevant to implementation of PRAs by states. The analysis is done using data for the state of Georgia. Simulations rely on recent patterns of intensive, supportive, and training services use. Simulations for alternative rules setting the PRA amount and varying behavioral responses are examined. Like the legislative proposal, simulated PRA offers are targeted using WPRS models. The key question examined is, how many PRA offers can a state make given a fixed budget? Proposed and alternative rules for substate budget allocation are also examined. The framework presented in this paper allows the exploration of several behavioral responses to incentives created by the PRA." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Re-employment bonuses in a signalling model of temporary layoffs (2004)
Rodriguez-Planas, Nuria;Zitatform
Rodriguez-Planas, Nuria (2004): Re-employment bonuses in a signalling model of temporary layoffs. (IZA discussion paper 1010), Bonn, 18 S.
Abstract
"Temporary layoffs are an important feature of the United States labor market. If these employer-employee relationships exist because of valuable job-matches, unemployment among high-productivity laid-off workers may be optimal from societal perspective. However, because of asymmetric information, low-productivity workers may behave strategically, and choose unemployment instead of low-wage jobs, resulting in an inefficient level of unemployment. This paper shows that in such cases, a re-employment bonus may give the correct incentives to laid-off workers and achieve the optimal equilibrium. The paper analyzes the equity properties of such a policy and its cost effectiveness. Finally, the model fits the data and offers several policy implications." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Cost-effectiveness of targeted reemployment bonuses (2003)
Zitatform
O'Leary, Christopher J., Paul T. Decker & Stephen A. Wandner (2003): Cost-effectiveness of targeted reemployment bonuses. (Upjohn Institute staff working paper 2003-51), Kalamazoo, 18 S.
Abstract
"Targeting reemployment bonus offers to unemployment insurance (UI) claimants identified as most likely to exhaust benefits is estimated to reduce benefit payments. We show that targeting bonus offers with profiling models similar to those in state Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services systems can improve cost effectiveness. Since estimated average benefit payments do not steadily decline as the eligibility screen is gradually tightened, we find that narrow targeting is not optimal. The best candidate is a low bonus amount with a long qualification period, targeted to the half of profiled claimants most likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))