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Hobbs, Duncan & Michael R. Strain (2024): Do Reemployment Bonuses Increase Employment? Evidence from the Idaho Return to Work Bonus Program. (IZA discussion paper / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 16924), Bonn, 58 S.

Abstract

"In June 2020, Idaho announced the Return to Work Bonus program, which provided residents who returned to work with bonuses of up to $1,500. Using multiple data sources, we present difference-in-differences, triple differences, and synthetic control estimates suggesting the program may have increased individual employment and accelerated flows into employment from unemployment and from nonparticipation in the labor force. We show the program likely increased state-level employment rates. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study the effects of reemployment bonuses on the U.S. labor market outside an experimental setting." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Komatsu, Katsuhiro (2024): The Welfare Impact of Reemployment Bonuses. (SSRN papers), Rochester, NY, 39 S. DOI:10.2139/ssrn.4534315

Abstract

"This paper investigates the welfare impact of reemployment bonuses in a dynamic job search model. Reemployment bonuses, monetary incentives offered to workers who obtain employment, may mitigate the moral hazard in unemployment insurance (UI) while preserving consumption smoothing. Using a sufficient statistics approach, I first show the substantial positive impact of reemployment bonuses on welfare given the current level of UI benefits. Then, by using a quantitative model of job search, consumption, and saving, I study the optimal combination of UI benefits and reemployment bonuses. I find that the optimal UI benefit level is higher when reemployment bonuses are incorporated. Compared to the welfare gain achieved by implementing only the optimal level of UI benefits, the optimal combination of UI benefits and reemployment bonuses achieves a 56 percent larger welfare gain." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Weber, Enzo (2024): Eine Anschubhilfe im Bürgergeld könnte die Erwerbsanreize erheblich stärken (IAB-Debattenbeiträge). In: IAB-Forum H. 26.06.2024 Nürnberg. DOI:10.48720/IAB.FOO.20240626.01

Abstract

"Es mutet an wie die Quadratur des Kreises: Spürbar bessere Anreize zu setzen, den Bezug von Bürgergeld zu verlassen, ohne zugleich die Kosten dafür völlig aus dem Ruder laufen zu lassen. Einen möglichen Ausweg aus diesem Dilemma böte eine finanzielle Anschubhilfe, wenn Erwerbseinkommen ausgeweitet wird. Dafür gibt es verschiedene Varianten, etwa über die Einkommensanrechnung." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)

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Beyhum, Jad, Jean-Pierre Florens & Ingrid Van Keilegom (2022): Nonparametric Instrumental Regression With Right Censored Duration Outcomes. In: Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Jg. 40, H. 3, S. 1034-1045. DOI:10.1080/07350015.2021.1895814

Abstract

"This article analyzes the effect of a discrete treatment Z on a duration T. The treatment is not randomly assigned. The confounding issue is treated using a discrete instrumental variable explaining the treatment and independent of the error term of the model. Our framework is nonparametric and allows for random right censoring. This specification generates a nonlinear inverse problem and the average treatment effect is derived from its solution. We provide local and global identification properties that rely on a nonlinear system of equations. We propose an estimation procedure to solve this system and derive rates of convergence and conditions under which the estimator is asymptotically normal. When censoring makes identification fail, we develop partial identification results. Our estimators exhibit good finite sample properties in simulations. We also apply our methodology to the Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiment." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Huang, Po-Chun & Tzu-Ting Yang (2021): The welfare effects of extending unemployment benefits: Evidence from re-employment and unemployment transfers. In: Journal of Public Economics, Jg. 202. DOI:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104500

Abstract

"This paper investigates the welfare effects of extending unemployment benefits by comparing the search effort responses to income transfers when employed (i.e. re-employment bonus) and unemployed (i.e. extended benefits). Specifically, we use administrative data on the universe of unemployment spells in Taiwan from 2001 to 2011 and evaluate effects of providing a re-employment bonus and extending unemployment benefits. Our results suggest that the provision of re-employment bonus increases job-finding hazards and results in the positive fiscal externality. The behavioral costs per New Taiwanese Dollar (NTD) of initial spending on bonuses is -0.61. In contrast, extending unemployment benefits reduces the rate of unemployment exit and generates the negative fiscal externality. We integrate the estimated policy effects with a search model with liquidity constraints to identify the value of extending unemployment benefits captured by the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption when unemployed and employed. We find that the estimated MRS of extending benefits is around 1.5 to 2.5 — the marginal value of transfers when unemployed is about two times larger than that when employed. Finally, the marginal value of public fund for extending UI benefits is between 1.3 and 2, suggesting the welfare gain from benefit extension is larger than its welfare cost by more than 30%." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, ©2021 Elsevier) ((en))

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Mitman, Kurt & Stanislav Rabinovich (2020): Optimal unemployment benefits in the pandemic. In: Covid economics H. 31, S. 187-201.

Abstract

"How should unemployment benefits vary in response to the economic crisis induced by the COVID-19 pandemic? We answer this question by computing the optimal unemployment insurance response to the COVIDinduced recession. We compare the optimal policy to the provisions under the CARES Act-which substantially expanded unemployment insurance and sparked an ongoing debate over further increases-and several alternative scenarios. We find that it is optimal first to raise unemployment benefits but then to begin lowering them as the economy starts to reopen - despite unemployment remaining high. We also find that the $600 UI supplement payment implemented under CARES was close to the optimal policy. Extending this UI supplement for another six months would hamper the recovery and reduce welfare. On the other hand, a UI extension combined with a re-employment bonus would further increase welfare compared to CARES alone, with only minimal effects on unemployment." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Arendt, Jacob Nielsen & Christophe Kolodziejczyk (2019): The Effects of an Employment Bonus for Long-Term Social Assistance Recipients. In: Journal of labor research, Jg. 40, H. 4, S. 412-427. DOI:10.1007/s12122-019-09290-3

Abstract

"This study uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate effects of an employment bonus program for long-term unemployed social assistance recipients. The program pays benefit bonuses to persons in the target group for any hours they work in regular employment or subsidized employment schemes. The program pays up to 6 % of post-tax earnings if they enter regular or subsidized employment over a specific two-year period. Our results show that the program has no effects on employment rates, earnings or participation in subsidized employment. The null findings are robust when using RD estimates based on different bandwidths and different window widths around the eligibility threshold and hold for given gender, age, ethnicity and parental status." (Author's Abstract, IAB-Doku)

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Berg, Gerard J. van den & Bas van der Klaauw (2019): Structural empirical evaluation of job search monitoring. In: International Economic Review, Jg. 60, H. 2, S. 879-903. DOI:10.1111/iere.12376

Abstract

"To evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers, it is important to take account of post-unemployment wages and job-to-job mobility. We structurally estimate a model with search channels, using an RCT in which monitoring is randomized. The data include registers and survey data on search behavior. We find that the opportunity to move to better-paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution towards formal search channels in unemployment. Job mobility compensates for adverse long-run effects of monitoring on wages. We examine counterfactual policies against moral hazard, like reemployment bonuses and changes of the benefits path." (Author's abstract, Published by arrangement with John Wiley & Sons) ((en))

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Ahn, Taehyun (2018): Assessing the effects of reemployment bonuses on job search: A regression discontinuity approach. In: Journal of Public Economics, Jg. 165, S. 82-100. DOI:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.07.003

Abstract

"This study examines the impacts of reemployment bonuses, that is, the incentive payments to unemployment insurance (UI) recipients who find a job within a specified period, using Korean data. A sharp discontinuity in treatment assignment at age 55 identifies the effect of increased reemployment bonuses on unemployment duration and on subsequent job duration. The results indicate that increases in the reemployment bonus boost the job-finding hazards of UI claimants early in their unemployment spells during the bonus qualification period and significantly shorten the duration of UI spells by 0.16 to 0.42 months (0.68 to 1.82 weeks). In addition, employment stability is not significantly affected by an increased bonus, which implies no negative influence of the bonus on subsequent job match quality. The simulated estimates show that the increase in tax revenue and the decrease in UI benefit payment caused by the behavioral response of UI recipients are large enough to offset the increased cost of the reemployment bonus." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, © 2018 Elsevier) ((en))

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(2017): Lessons Learned from Public Workforce Program Experiments. (WE focus series), Kalamazoo: Upjohn Press, 125 S. DOI:10.17848/9780880996310

Abstract

"This book chronicles many of the most important experiments and the key lessons derived from the evaluations of both existing large-scale public workforce programs and the development of new interventions—including low-cost experiments based on behavioral science methods." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Reysz, Julien (2015): Financial incentives to return to work: a comparison between Germany and France. Grenoble, 11 S.

Abstract

"European welfare states have developed instruments to ensure the reintegration of the excluded from the labour market (and the job retention of the employees). These instruments developed for the recipients receiving unemployment insurance benefits and for the welfare recipients (only for those who are able to work) have concerned two levels. In terms of financing of social policies, resources come from increasing taxation (social public expenditures are more financed by the tax and less by the social contributions). In terms of targeted people, these instruments have mainly consisted of financial incentives to return to work. Incentives to work can be positive incentives (opportunities and orientation of individuals’ behaviours) or negative incentives (obligations and sanctions); but only the first ones, based on the logic of monetary motivation to work, can be seen as financial incentives." (Text excerpt, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Klaauw, Bas van der & Jan C. van Ours (2013): Carrot and stick: How re-employment bonuses and benefit sanctions affect exit rates from welfare. In: Journal of Applied Econometrics, Jg. 28, H. 2, S. 275-296. DOI:10.1002/jae.1265

Abstract

"To increase the exit from welfare, benefit recipients in the municipality of Rotterdam were exposed to various financial incentives. Once their benefit spell exceeded one year, welfare recipients were entitled to a re-employment bonus if they found a job that lasted at least 6 months. However, they could also be punished for noncompliance with eligibility requirements and face a sanction, i.e. a temporary reduction of their benefits. We find that the financial sticks in the form of benefit sanctions were effective in stimulating the exit from welfare, while the financial carrots in the form of re-employment bonuses were not." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Kim, Hyun Ah, Yong-seong Kim & Myoung-jae Lee (2012): Treatment effect analysis of early reemployment bonus program. Panel MLE and mode-based semiparametric estimator for interval truncation. In: Portuguese Economic Journal, Jg. 11, H. 3, S. 189-209. DOI:10.1007/s10258-012-0084-5

Abstract

"We use Korean data to find the effects of Early Reemployment Bonus (ERB) on unemployment duration; ERB is a bonus that the eligible unemployed receive if they find a job before their unemployment insurance benefit expires. A naive approach would be comparing the ERB receiving group with the non-receiving group, but the ERB receipt is partly determined by the unemployment duration itself (thus, an endogeneity problem). Interestingly, there were many individuals who did not receive the ERB despite being fully eligible, and this is attributed to being unaware of the ERB scheme. Taking this as a 'pseudo randomization', we construct treatment and control groups using only the eligible. Our data set is an unbalanced panel with the response variable interval-truncated due to eligibility requirement of the ERB. We propose a panel random-effect MLE and a semi-parametric 'mode-based' estimator for the interval-truncated response. Our empirical finding is that the effect varies much, depending on individual characteristics. As for the mean effects, whereas the MLE indicates large duration-shortening effects, the semi-parametric estimator shows much weaker and mostly insignificant effects." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Klaauw, Bas van der & Jan C. van Ours (2010): Carrot and stick: How reemployment bonuses and benefit sanctions affect job finding rates. (IZA discussion paper 5055), Bonn, 31 S.

Abstract

"To increase their transition from welfare to work, benefit recipients in the municipality of Rotterdam were exposed to various financial incentives, including both carrots to sticks. Once their benefit spell exceeded one year, welfare recipients were entitled to a reemployment bonus if they found a job that lasted at least six months. However, they could also be punished for noncompliance with eligibility requirements and face a sanction, i.e. a temporary reducing of their benefits. In this paper we investigate how benefit sanctions and reemployment bonuses affect job finding rates of welfare recipients. We find that benefit sanctions were effective in bringing unemployed from welfare to work more quickly while reemployment bonuses were not." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Wandner, Stephen A. (2010): Solving the reemployment puzzle. From research to policy. Kalamazoo: Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 507 S.

Abstract

"This book provides a detailed insider's view under the Clinton and Bush administrations of the process by which eight social science experiments influenced federal laws and policies to alleviate joblessness in the United States. These experiments, each of which focused on returning unemployed workers to work, are analyzed through their entire policy process: experiment initiation, implementation, and evaluation; policy development; legislative enactment; program development; and program implementation. Stephen Wandner also reveals that such rigorous scientific research can, but sometimes doesn't, influence federal workforce policy and legislation. For research to affect public policy, political leaders must commit to funding, conducting, and using research. Implementing research findings requires that government officials at the national, state, and local levels be supportive of the research results and use them to develop new and innovative programs and processes. When policymakers use research results as a prominent ingredient in policymaking, they are more likely to develop cost-effective policy that works. However, when the impartial research is not conducted or the research results are ignored or misused, policy, programs, and ultimately workers suffer." (author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Kaltenborn, Bruno & Petra Knerr (2006): Arbeitsanreize im Niedriglohnbereich - ein ausgewählter internationaler Vergleich. Gutachten. (Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung und Politikberatung 30), Berlin, 232 S.

Abstract

"In Deutschland werden ebenso wie in anderen westlichen Industrieländern Strategien zur Ausweitung der als unzureichend erachteten Beschäftigung von Personen mit geringem Verdienstpotenzial diskutiert. Eine Beschäftigung setzt insbesondere ein entsprechendes Arbeitsangebot eines Arbeitnehmers, eine dazu passende Arbeitsnachfrage eines Unternehmens und die Kenntnis beider voneinander voraus. Entsprechend gibt es mehrere Ansatzpunkte für Strategien zur Ausweitung der Beschäftigung. Derartige Strategien werden unter anderem für den Niedriglohnbereich diskutiert und auch bereits verfolgt. Die Strategien lassen sich einerseits nach ihrem Ansatzpunkt (Arbeitsangebot von Arbeitnehmern, Arbeitsnachfrage von Unternehmen sowie Matching von Arbeitsangebot und -nachfrage) und andererseits nach der Leistungsart (Geldleistungen, Sach- und Dienstleistungen, Rahmenbedingungen) klassifizieren.
Die nähere Betrachtung erfolgt unter zwei Gesichtspunkten:
- Einerseits erfolgt eine detaillierte Betrachtung einzelner ausländischer Steuer-Transfer- Systeme, um Gestaltungsoptionen aufzuzeigen (Kapitel 2). Dies ist angesichts des Aufwandes nur für einzelne Länder möglich. Für die notwendigen Details der jeweiligen Steuer-Transfer-Systeme am aktuellen Rand ist in der Regel eine Auswertung nationaler Quellen in der jeweiligen Landessprache erforderlich. Insgesamt wurden hierfür fünf Staaten ausgewählt (Italien, Frankreich, Großbritannien, Irland und die USA).
- Andererseits ist das Resultat des komplexen Zusammenspiels der Steuer-Transfer- Systeme unterschiedlicher Länder hinsichtlich der Anreize im Niedriglohnbereich von Interesse (Kapitel 3). Für eine derartige Betrachtung ist ebenfalls eine detaillierte Auswertung der jeweiligen Steuer-Transfer-Systeme erforderlich. Da hier auf Vorarbeiten der OECD zurückgegriffen werden kann, können über die fünf bereits in Kapitel 2 betrachteten Staaten hinaus weitere in die Analyse einbezogen werden. Insgesamt werden 15 westliche Industrieländer berücksichtigt." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)

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O'Leary, Christopher J., Paul T. Decker & Stephen A. Wandner (2005): Cost-effectiveness of targeted reemployment bonuses. In: The Journal of Human Resources, Jg. 40, H. 1, S. 270-279. DOI:10.3368/jhr.XL.1.270

Abstract

"Targeting reemployment bonus offers to unemployment insurance (UI) claimants identified as most likely to exhaust benefits is estimated to reduce benefit payments. We show that targeting bonus offers with profiling models similar to those in state Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services systems can improve cost effectiveness. Since estimated average benefit payments do not steadily decline as the eligibility screen is gradually tightened, we find that narrow targeting is not optimal. The best candidate is a low bonus amount with a long qualification period, targeted to the half of profiled claimants most likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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O'Leary, Christopher J. & Randall W. Eberts (2004): Personal reemployment accounts. Simulations for planning implementation. (Upjohn Institute staff working paper 2004-110), Kalamazoo, 64 S.

Abstract

"The proposed Back to Work Incentive Act of 2003 recommended personal reemployment accounts (PRAs) that would provide each eligible unemployment insurance (UI) claimant with a special account of up to $3,000 to finance reemployment activities. Account funds could be used to purchase intensive, supportive, and job training services. Any funds remaining in the PRA could be paid as a cash bonus for reemployment within 13 weeks, or drawn as extended income maintenance for exhaustees of regular UI benefits. Personal reemployment account offers would be targeted to UI beneficiaries most likely to exhaust their UI entitlements using state Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) models. The draft legislation called for a budget of $3.6 billion for PRAs, with the money to be committed over a two-year period. This report provides a simulation analysis of questions relevant to implementation of PRAs by states. The analysis is done using data for the state of Georgia. Simulations rely on recent patterns of intensive, supportive, and training services use. Simulations for alternative rules setting the PRA amount and varying behavioral responses are examined. Like the legislative proposal, simulated PRA offers are targeted using WPRS models. The key question examined is, how many PRA offers can a state make given a fixed budget? Proposed and alternative rules for substate budget allocation are also examined. The framework presented in this paper allows the exploration of several behavioral responses to incentives created by the PRA." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Rodriguez-Planas, Nuria (2004): Re-employment bonuses in a signalling model of temporary layoffs. (IZA discussion paper 1010), Bonn, 18 S.

Abstract

"Temporary layoffs are an important feature of the United States labor market. If these employer-employee relationships exist because of valuable job-matches, unemployment among high-productivity laid-off workers may be optimal from societal perspective. However, because of asymmetric information, low-productivity workers may behave strategically, and choose unemployment instead of low-wage jobs, resulting in an inefficient level of unemployment. This paper shows that in such cases, a re-employment bonus may give the correct incentives to laid-off workers and achieve the optimal equilibrium. The paper analyzes the equity properties of such a policy and its cost effectiveness. Finally, the model fits the data and offers several policy implications." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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O'Leary, Christopher J., Paul T. Decker & Stephen A. Wandner (2003): Cost-effectiveness of targeted reemployment bonuses. (Upjohn Institute staff working paper 2003-51), Kalamazoo, 18 S.

Abstract

"Targeting reemployment bonus offers to unemployment insurance (UI) claimants identified as most likely to exhaust benefits is estimated to reduce benefit payments. We show that targeting bonus offers with profiling models similar to those in state Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services systems can improve cost effectiveness. Since estimated average benefit payments do not steadily decline as the eligibility screen is gradually tightened, we find that narrow targeting is not optimal. The best candidate is a low bonus amount with a long qualification period, targeted to the half of profiled claimants most likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Bijwaard, Govert E. & Geert Ridder (2001): Correcting for Selective Compliance in a Re-employment Bonus Experiment. (SSRN papers), Los Angeles, CA, 42 S. DOI:10.2139/ssrn.277747

Abstract

"We propose a two-stage instrumental variable estimator that is consistent if there is selective compliance in the treatment group of a randomized experiment and the outcome variable is a censored duration. The estimator assumes full compliance in the control group. We use the estimator to reanalyze data from the Illinois re-employment bonus experiment." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Bloom, Howard S., Saul Schwartz, Susanna Lui-Gurr, Suk-Won Lee, Jason Peng & Wendy Bancroft (2001): Testing a Financial Incentive to Promote Re-employment among Displaced Workers. The Canadian Earnings Supplement Project (ESP). In: Journal of policy analysis and management, Jg. 20, H. 3, S. 505-523. DOI:10.1002/pam.1005

Abstract

"This article presents findings from a randomized experiment conducted in four Canadian provinces to measure the effects of a generous financial incentive that was designed to promote rapid re-employment among workers who were displaced from their jobs by changing economic conditions. The incentive tested was an earnings supplement which, for as long as 2 years and as much as $250 weekly, would replace 75 percent of the earnings loss incurred by displaced workers who took a new lower-paying full-time job within six months of receiving a supplement offer. Findings from the experiment indicate that although persons offered the supplement understood its terms and conditions, only 2 out of 10 actually received supplement payments. Furthermore, the supplement offer had little effect on job-search behavior, employment prospects, or receipt of unemployment insurance. Nevertheless, persons who received supplement payments benefited from them substantially. On average, they received payments for 64 weeks, totaling $8,705. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, Published by arrangement with John Wiley & Sons) ((en))

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Robins, Philip K. & Robert G. Spiegelman (Hrsg.) (2001): Reemployment bonuses in the unemployment insurance system. Evidence from three field experiments. Kalamazoo: Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 295 S.

Abstract

"During the 1980s, the federal government sponsored social experiments to determine whether or not offers of financial bonuses persuaded recipients of unemployment insurance to return to work sooner. A number of experimental designs were tried and some clear results were seen. While policy makers so far have chosen not to implement such bonus offers, the issue of how to increase active job search among UI recipients remains an issue, and bonus offers constitute one of only a handful of program options at their disposal that might achieve that goal.
In this volume, a select group of UI researchers describes the motivation for and the design, implementation, and impacts of UI bonus experiments administered in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington. They also describe the benefits and costs of the various experimental treatments for the government as a whole, the UI system in particular, claimants' earnings, and the overall net benefits to society. This volume analyzes experiments that are virtually unique for social policy research (i.e., multiple experiments with similar designs that enable comparison of results of experiments conducted in different locations and different social contexts), as well as the movement from experiment to policy by considering impacts on nonparticipants and explicit benefit-cost analysis.
- An introductory chapter, Introduction and Background of the Reemployment Bonus Experiments, by Robert G. Spiegelman, is followed by
- Design of Three Field Experiments, Walter S. Corson and Robert G. Spiegelman. These authors discuss the four elements of an experimental design: 1) who participates, 2) experimental treatments, 3) the number of subjects and their allocation, and 4) experiment location and conditions. They also consider the difficulties related to random assignment and describe experimental operations.
- Participation in the Reemployment Bonus Experiments, Paul T. Decker, Christopher J. O'Leary, and Stephen A. Woodbury. The trio describes the participants and rules of participation in the experiments and then estimates the extent to which UI claimants assigned to the experiments failed to collect bonuses for which they were eligible. The amount 'left on the table' has significant policy implications for any program modeled after the experiments.
- Bonus Impacts on Receipt of Unemployment Insurance, Paul T. Decker, Christopher J. O'Leary, and Stephen A. Woodbury. This chapter presents the primary results of the experiments, namely the effects directly on the UI system. The impact on the dollar value of benefits paid to claimants and the duration of insured unemployment are also estimated.
- Impacts on Employment and Earnings, Paul T. Decker, Christopher J. O'Leary, and Stephen A. Woodbury. The authors discuss a group of supplementary results from the experiments, primarily the impact of the treatments on the earnings of claimants, the nature and quality of jobs, and employer attachment.
- From Social Experiment to Program, Carl Davidson and Stephen A. Woodbury. Davidson and Woodbury provide the bridge from experiment to program by discussing issues inherent in translating experimental results into operational programs. The authors also attempt to quantify the effects of a bonus offer in a full program on the 'entry effect' (the tendency to increase filing for UI benefits) and on 'displacement,' or crowding out (the tendency for participants to increase job acquisition at the expense of nonparticipants).
- A Benefit-Cost Analysis of a Bonus Offer Program, Robert G. Spiegelman. Spiegelman presents the results of a benefit-cost analysis that shows the net benefits to society, the government, the UI system, and claimants that can be derived from a bonus offer program.
- Summary and Policy Implications, Philip K. Robins. Robins presents an overview of the features and findings of the experiments, as well as the policy implications derived from them. The expected effects of a bonus offer program on work effort and the UI system are described, as is why an experimental approach to answering the questions seems warranted. Four cost-effective policies aimed at reducing insured unemployment are also discussed." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Jahn, Elke J. & Thomas Wagner (2000): Senkt aktive Jobsuche die Arbeitslosigkeit? (WEP-working paper 04), Erlangen u.a., 39 S.

Abstract

"Arbeitslose verbessern durch aktive Jobsuche ihre Vermittlungschance, doch der Schluß, daß aktive Jobsuche die aggregierte Arbeitslosigkeit reduziert, beruht auf einer fallacy of composition. Der Arbeitslosenpool besteht aus heterogenen Typen, deren typspezifische Übergangsraten unterschiedlich auf die Zahl der aktiven Jobsucher unter den konkurrierenden Arbeitslosengruppen und die Zahl der offerierten Vakanzen reagieren. Das Modell zeigt, warum Arbeitsmarktpolitik, die darauf zielt, mit Suchvorschriften oder Wiederbeschäftigungsprämien die Anzahl der aktiven Jobsucher unter den Arbeitslosen zu erhöhen, die aggregierte Arbeitslosigkeit steigern kann." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)

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Smith, Jeffrey (2000): Evaluation aktiver Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Erfahrungen aus Nordamerika. In: Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Jg. 33, H. 3, S. 345-356.

Abstract

Der Beitrag untersucht die Lehren, die aus der Evalutionsforschung in den USA für die Wirkungsforschung der deutschen Arbeitsmarktpolitik gezogen werden können. Der Autor betrachtet zunächst die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen, innerhalb derer Evaluation stattfindet: Welche Individuen, Unternehmen oder Organisationen führen Evaluationen durch, wer sind die Auftraggeber und wer evaluiert - explizit oder implizit - die Evaluatoren. Es wird argumentiert, dass diese institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen eine entscheidende Rolle dabei spielen, ob Evaluationen objektiv durchgeführt werden und somit der Poliltik und öffentlichen Meinung von Nutzen sein können. Die zweite Fragestellung betrifft die Wahl zwischen verschiedenen ökonometrischen Evaluationsmethoden. Der Autor argumentiert, dass bei der Methodenwahl und der Interpretation der Ergebnisse berücksichtigt werden muss, dass der Einfluss eines Programms zwischen den Individuen variieren kann. Anschließend werden Kosten und Nutzen von sozialen Experimenten und die Einsatzmöglichkeiten der jüngeren Propensity Score Matching Methoden angesprochen. Zum Abschluss wird auf die Bedeutung von allgemeinen Gleichgewichtseffekten in der Evaluationsforschung eingegangen. (IAB2)

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Davidson, Carl & Stephen A. Woodbury (1996): Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment: Implications of the Reemployment Bonus Experiments. (Upjohn Institute working paper 44), Kalamazoo, Mich., 28 S. DOI:10.17848/wp96-44

Abstract

"We translate the results of the three reemployment bonus experiments that were conducted during the 1980s into (a) impacts of a 10-percentage point increase in the Unemployment Insurance (UI) replacement rate on the expected duration of unemployment; and (b) impacts of adding 1 week to the potential duration of UI benefits on the expected duration of unemployment. Our approach is to use an equilibrium search and matching model, calibrated using data from the bonus experiments and secondary sources. The results suggest that a 10-percentage point increase in the UI replacement rate increases the expected duration of unemployment by .3 to 1.1 week (a range consistent with, but only somewhat narrower than, the existing range of estimates), and that adding 1 week to the potential duration of UI benefits increases the expected duration of unemployment by .05 to .2 week (which is toward the low end of existing estimates)." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Walter, Corson & Haimson Joshua (1996): The New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration Project: Six-year follow-up and summary report. Revised edition. (Unemployment insurance occasional paper 1996,02), Washington DC, 173 S.

Abstract

"The purpose of the New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration Project (NJUIRDP) was to examine whether the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system could be used to identify displaced workers early in their unemployment spells and to provide them with alternative, early intervention services to accelerate their return to work. This second follow-up study extended the analysis for approximately six years after the initial UI claim to identify any long-run treatment impacts, particularly for trainees. This follow-up evaluation found additional long-run UI impacts suggesting that each component of the treatments--JSA, training, and the reemployment bonus--probably contributed to the longer-term impacts and that the treatments, in general, generated jobs that were more stable than those found by control group members." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Decker, Paul T. & Christopher J. O'Leary (1995): Evaluating pooled evidence from the reemployment bonus experiments. In: The Journal of Human Resources, Jg. 30, H. 3, S. 534-550.

Abstract

Die Autoren gehen der Frage nach, ob durch einen Wiederbeschäftigungs-Bonus an die Unternehmen Arbeitslose wieder schneller eine Erwerbsarbeit aufnehmen können. Die Autoren verneinen die Frage. (IAB)

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Meyer, Bruce D. (1995): Lessons from the U.S. unemployment insurance experiments. In: Journal of Economic Literature, Jg. 33, H. 1, S. 91-131.

Abstract

Der Autor berichtet über experimentelle Reformansätze der Arbeitslosenversicherung in den USA, die die Wiederbeschäftigungschancen verbessern sollen und evaluiert die Ergebnisse dieser Programme. Dabei handelte es sich zum einen um Bonus-Experimente (Arbeitslose, die eine neue Stelle fanden, erhielten eine Bonus-Zahlung), zum anderen um Programme, bei denen die Betroffenen mehr Informationen über offene Stellen erhielten, aber auch verschärften Anspruchsvoraussetzungen für Arbeitslosenunterstützung unterworfen waren. (IAB)

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O'Leary, Christopher J., Robert G. Spiegelman & Kenneth J. Kline (1995): Do Bonus Offers Shorten Unemployment Insurance Spells? Results from the Washington Experiment. In: Journal of policy analysis and management, Jg. 14, H. 2, S. 245-269. DOI:10.2307/3325152

Abstract

"Unemployment insurance is intended to reduce hardship by providing labor force members with partial wage replacement during periods of involuntary unemployment. However, in performing this income maintenance function, unemployment insurance may prolong spells of unemployment. Evidence from a field experiment conducted in Illinois in 1984 suggested that offering unemployment insurance claimants a modest cash bonus for rapid reemployment would increase the speed of return to work and reduce program costs. In 1988 a similar experiment, examining several different bonus offers, was conducted in the state of Washington. Evidence from the Washington experiment indicates that bonus offers do change job seeking behavior, but that only relatively generous bonus offers--about six times the weekly benefit amount--should be expected to significantly change the behavior of people eligible for unemployment benefits." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, Published by arrangement with John Wiley & Sons) ((en))

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Decker, Paul T. (1994): The Impact of Reemployment Bonuses on Insured Unemployment in the New Jersey and Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiments. In: The Journal of Human Resources, Jg. 29, H. 3, S. 718-741.

Abstract

"Separate social experiments conducted in New Jersey and Illinois tested the effect of offering Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants a cash bonus for rapid reemployment. The Illinois bonus was constant over time, while the New Jersey bonus declined over time, so that the bonus received was greater the earlier that reemployment occurred. This paper compares the effects of the bonus offers on the rate at which claimants exited UI. The New Jersey and Illinois bonus offers generated similar increases in the UI exit rate during the period in which claimants could qualify for the bonus. However, the declining New Jersey bonus had little impact on long-term claimants who exhausted their UI benefits. In contrast, the constant Illinois bonus had a substantial impact on long-term claimants, thereby reducing the rate at which claimants exhausted their UI benefits. This finding at least partly explains why the Illinois bonus had a larger impact on UI receipt than the New Jersey bonus." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, © the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System) ((en))

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O'Leary, Christopher J. (1994): A Reemployment Incentives Experiment in Canada: Issues in Design, Administration and Evaluation. (Reports / W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research), Kalamazoo, Mich., 21 S.

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Davidson, Carl & Stephen A. Woodbury (1993): The Displacement Effect of Reemployment Bonus Programs. In: Journal of labor economics, Jg. 11, H. 4, S. 575-605. DOI:10.1086/298308

Abstract

"We develop a partial equilibrium matching model of the labor market in order to examine whether adoption of a reemployment bonus would displace workers not offered the bonus. We examine the displacement effect for (a) unemployment insurance (UI)-eligible workers who are offered but do not find a job in time to qualify for a bonus and (b) UI-ineligible workers who are never offered a bonus. The model predicts minimal displacement of the former group. But for the latter group, the model predicts an increase in unemployment duration of .2-.4 week and an increase in unemployment of up to 2 per thousand." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Anderson, Patricia M. (1992): Time-Varying Effects of Recall Expectation, a Reemployment Bonus, and Job Counseling on Unemployment Durations. In: Journal of labor economics, Jg. 10, H. 1, S. 99-115. DOI:10.1086/298280

Abstract

"A simple search model that includes the possibility of recall provides predictions as to the changing effects of recall expectations, a bonus offer, and job counseling on new job finding rates over time. Using data from the New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration Project (NJUIRDP), I find evidence for an initial positive effect of the bonus offer, which diminishes over time. New job-finding rates are found to be negatively affected by higher initial recall expectations. This effect also diminishes over time, and evidence suggests that job counseling is successful in speeding up this process." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Corson, Walter, Paul Decker, Shari Dunstan & Stuart Kerachsky (1992): Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Demonstration. Final Report. (Unemployment insurance occasional paper 1992,06), Washington DC, 254 S.

Abstract

"The Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Demonstration tested the effect of alternative reemployment bonuses on the reemployment and UI receipt of UI claimants. The demonstration showed that reeemployment bonuses can reduce the amount of time spent on UI, thereby reducing benefit payments. The demonstration also provided some evidence that the bonus offers increased the employment and earnings of claimants." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Kettunen, Juha (1992): Increasing Incentives for Re-employment. (Discussion papers / Research Institute of the Finnish Economy 415), Helsinki, 30 S.

Abstract

"This paper studies the incentives of unemployed workers for reemployment using search models and semi-parametric econometric methods with applications for individual data on unemployment durations. It is shown that the reemployment probability can be increased substantially by offering reemployment bonuses to the unemployed workers. Other means of encouraging the workers are to remove the protective rules regarding labour mobility of the Finnish Unemployment Insurance Act and to reduce the benefits after a fixed period of unemployment. Politically this may be difficult, but on the other hand the welfare of all the unemployed persons can be increased by removing the waiting period of benefits." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Kim, Iljoong (1992): The effectiveness of a reemployment bonus. In: Economics Letters, Jg. 39, H. 3, S. 345-351. DOI:10.1016/0165-1765(92)90272-z

Abstract

"This paper investigates the effectiveness of the recently proposed reemployment bonus, relative to the regular Unemployment Insurance benefits, in a model where endogenous search effort plays a crucial role and the bonus is fully portrayed as an incentive contract." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, © 1992 Elsevier) ((en))

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Meyer, Bruce D. (1992): Policy Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Experiments. (NBER working paper / National Bureau of Economic Research 4197), Cambridge, Mass, 63 S.

Abstract

"Recently, there has been extensive experimental evaluation of reforms of the unemployment insurance (UI) system. The UI experiments can be divided into two main areas: reemployment bonuses and job search programs. The four reemployment bonus experiments offered payments to UI recipients who found jobs quickly and kept them for a specified period of time. The six job search experiments evaluated combinations of services including additional information on job openings, more job placements, and more extensive checks of UI eligibility. The bonus experiments show that economic incentives do affect the speed with which people leave the unemployment insurance rolls. They also show that speeding claimants' return to work appears to increase total earnings following the claim, but the evidence is less strong. They also suggest that the rate of pay on the new job is not adversely affected by an earlier return to work. Despite these encouraging results, I argue that the experiments do not show that permanent adoption of a reemployment bonus would be beneficial as they cannot account for the effect of a reemployment bonus on the size of the claimant population. The job search experiments test several reforms that appear more promising. Nearly all of the combinations of services and increased enforcement reduce UI receipt, and have benefits that exceed costs. The treatments which mainly increase enforcement of work search rules have small but often statistically significant effects. The experiments which focus more on providing services induce much larger reductions in UI receipt, but at a higher cost of services per claimant. Nevertheless, these experiments have very favorable ratios of benefits to costs." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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O'Leary, Christopher J., Robert Spiegelman & Kenneth J. Kline (1992): The Washington Reemployment Bonus Experiment. Final Report. (Unemployment insurance occasional paper 1992,06), Washington DC, 227 S.

Abstract

"The purpose of the Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) was to validate results of the previous experiments, test a new range of reemployment bonus plans, and identify the most cost-effective plan. WREB was designed by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research in collaboration with the Washington State Employment Security Department (WSESD) and the USDOL." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Davidson, Carl & Stephen A. Woodbury (1991): Effects of a Reemployment Bonus under Differing Benefit Entitlements, or, Why the Illinois Experiment Worked. Presented at the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM), Twelfth Annual Research Conference, San Francisco, CA, October 18-20. (Conference papers / W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research), Kalamazoo, Mich., 58 S.

Abstract

"Fifty-eight percent of the workers enrolled in the Illinois Claimant Bonus experiment were eligible for 38 weeks of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits--26 weeks of state-regular benefits plus 12 weeks of Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC). The other 42 percent were eligible for only 26 weeks of state-regular UI benefits. We find that the Claimant Bonus treatment--an offer of $500 in cash for rapid reemployment--reduced the duration of insured unemployment by about 1.8 weeks for workers who were eligible for 38 weeks of UI benefits, but by only about 0.75 week for the workers who were eligible for 26 weeks of UI. We specify a search/matching model for each of the two groups (FSC-eligible and -ineligible) and find that (a) the model predicts a far larger bonus impact for workers eligible for 38 weeks of benefits than for those eligible for 26 weeks, and (b) the model's quantitative predictions cannot be rejected by the data." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Meyer, Bruce D. (1988): Implications of the Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiments For Theories of Unemployment and Policy Design. (NBER working paper / National Bureau of Economic Research 2783), Cambridge, Mass, 61 S.

Abstract

"Reemployment bonus experiments offer large lump sum payments to unemployment insurance (UI) recipients who find a job quickly. Such experiments are underway or have been recently completed in four states. This paper analyzes the results from Illinois and discusses the implications of the experiments for theories of unemployment and policy design. I examine the hazard rate of exit from unemployment and find that it is significantly higher for the experimental groups, but only during the period of bonus eligibility. Both labor supply and search theories of unemployment are shown to suggest a rise in the reemployment hazard just before the end of bonus eligibility and to suggest larger effects of the fixed amount bonus for lower income groups. Only weak support is found for these hypotheses, which suggests limitations of the models of unemployment. Some modifications of the models are suggested. The experiments demonstrate the effects of economic incentives on job finding behavior but they do not show the desirability of a permanent reemployment bonus program. Evidence from another sample suggests that as many as half of those who received a reemployment bonus returned to their previous employer, so that a bonus program that pays people returning to their last employer would provide a strong encouragement to temporary layoffs. A discussion of UI claim filing behavior suggests that a permanent program could well increase the frequency or promptness of filing, thus reducing any financial advantages of a bonus program" (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Woodbury, Stephen A. & Robert G. Spiegelman (1987): Bonuses to Workers and Employers to Reduce Unemployment: Randomized Trials in Illinois. In: The American economic review, Jg. 77, H. 4, S. 513-530.

Abstract

"New claimants for Unemployment Insurance were randomly assigned to one of two experiments that were designed to speed up the return to work. In the first experiment, a $500 bonus was offered to eligible claimants who obtained employment within 11 weeks. This experiment reduced the number of weeks of insured unemployment, averaged over all assigned claimants whether or not they participated, by more than one week. In the second experiment, the $500 bonus was offered to the subsequent employer of the eligible claimant. This experiment reduced the weeks of insured unemployment for only one important group - white women - by about one week." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))