Abstract

This study refers to job matching processes in occupational labour markets. Each of these markets comprises jobs that share extensive commonalities in their required qualifications and tasks. According to previous studies these markets reveal different matching efficiencies, but not much is known about the determinants of these differences. We discuss why certain occupational specific properties could determine information asymmetries and, therefore, the costs of job or worker search, respectively. We propose two categories of such occupational properties: the degree of standardization and the quantity of tasks in an occupation. We show in a search theoretic model that the higher the standardization of an occupation or the lower the quantity of tasks is the lower are ceteris paribus the search costs, the higher is the optimal search intensity and, thus, the higher is the matching efficiency. We empirically validate these results based on rich administrative data for 2000 to 2011. The results have direct implications for employment policy: standardized training and efforts to raise the transparency of labour market structures can contribute to a well-functioning labour market.