A hiring subsidy for long-term unemployed in a search model with PES and random search

Abstract

"Our search model combines two search methods, the public employment service (PES) and random search. The separation rate is endogenous, the job matching process consists of three rounds. In the first and the second respectively the short-term (STU) and the long-term unemployed (LTU) randomly search for a vacancy. During the last round the PES matches registered jobseekers with registered vacancies. The LTU cause training costs and, during the training period, have a lower marginal product than the STU. The effects of the hiring subsidy and of profiling techniques to increase the effectiveness of the PES depend on the target group they are geared towards. For skill groups, who have relatively low private search costs in comparison with their productivity, not only the hiring subsidy but also the job placement activities of the PES are counterproductive and reduce overall employment." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Cite article

Jahn, E. & Wagner, T. (2002): A hiring subsidy for long-term unemployed in a search model with PES and random search. (Universität Erlangen, Nürnberg, Lehrstuhl für Arbeitsmarkt- und Regionalpolitik. Diskussionspapiere 11), Erlangen u.a., 30 p.