Worker absence, sickpay and contracted hours

Abstract

"The paper seeks to explore the effect of the remuneration contract on worker absence behaviour. The authors employ an econometric model with bivariate heterogeneity, which also allows for the effect of the contract to have different effects dependent on the state occupied. The data are drawn from a UK manufacturing firm, which produces a homogeneous product using production lines. The remuneration contract offered has an experiencerated sickpay scheme in which the level of sickpay entitlement is linked to the worker's past attendance behaviour. A measure of daily cost of absence, as defined by the difference between daily earnings and sickpay entitlement, has a negative effect on the probability of absence and this effect is stronger when the worker is absent. High contracted hours appears to increase absence but this effect comes though an increase in the conditional prohability of absence given the worker attended in the previous time period. This means that higher contracted hours will, on this evidence, increase the incidence of absence spells rather than change the structure of their duration." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Cite article

Barmby, T. (2001): Worker absence, sickpay and contracted hours. In: L. Bellmann, K. Gerlach, O. Hübler & W. Meyer (Hrsg.) (2001): Beschäftigungseffekte betrieblicher Arbeitszeitgestaltung (Beiträge zur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 251), p. 95-104.