Selektivität von Ein-Euro-Job-Ankündigungen

Abstract

"The German workfare programme 'One-Euro-Jobs' can be used for different goals. On the one hand, they aim at improving employment prospects of long-term jobless welfare recipients. On the other hand, they can also be used to test the willingness to work of welfare recipients. Based on data from the panel study 'Labour Market and Social Security' and logit models, this paper studies the selectivity of One-Euro-Job announcements. For a subsample we also study what determines whether a welfare recipient actually participates in an announced One-Euro-Job. We find a concentration of One-Euro-Jobs on welfare recipients with below average employment prospects and those who are anyway in the attention of jobcentres. We cannot find evidence for a strong use of One-Euro-Jobs as work-test. Concerning the actual participation in an announced One-Euro-Job, we find health condition and commitment in long-term care to hinder participation. We do not find evidence for strong announcement effects or welfare recipients leaving benefit receipt as reason for non-participation." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Cite article

Hohmeyer, K. & Wolff, J. (2015): Selektivität von Ein-Euro-Job-Ankündigungen. (IAB-Forschungsbericht 02/2015), Nürnberg, 36 p.