Abstract

Research has shown that male welfare benefit recipients in Germany are twice as likely to be sanctioned as female welfare recipients. Nevertheless, why this happens is not yet fully understood. Using a decomposition analysis, we address this question by testing three explanations. First, distributions of sociodemographic factors may influence the sanction risk. E.g., singles have the highest sanction probabilities. As most male welfare recipients are single, it appears that men (self-)select into sanctioning. Second, we explore whether the past inflow into active labor market programs affects the sanction risk. If men must comply with such programs more often, they will have a higher risk of undergoing sanctioning processes. Third, we pose the question of whether job centers are more protective of women. Or rather, does intra-sex and inter-sex negotiating affect the risk of sanctions? For this, we analyze whether and to which extent the share of one’s gender among job-center’s caseworkers and welfare recipients contributes to the gender sanction gap.