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Artificial Intelligence (AI) can perform cognitively demanding tasks with more autonomy than previous technologies.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) can perform cognitively demanding tasks with more autonomy than previous technologies and is thus expected to have disruptive effects on labor markets. But empirical evidence is limited. Does AI already affect workers’ wages? And how exactly does AI diffuse through labor markets? To answer these questions, we combine novel job vacancy data from Germany with high-quality administrative data and contribute three main findings.

First, using an IV approach, we find that a 10% increase in demand for AI skills implies average AI-induced wage returns of 2%. Second, we identify three key drivers behind our results and find that 95% of AI-induced wage effects are attributed to: (1) Employer Quality, (2) Socioeconomic, and (3) occupational characteristics. Third, we explore mechanisms, suggesting that the primary beneficiaries of AI demand are male workers with: (i) only modest AI exposure, (ii) college education, (iii) 50+ years of age, (iv) occupational mobility, and (v) employment at high-quality firms. Our paper provides valuable insights for policymakers by identifying early winners and losers of growing AI diffusion and offers promising avenues for future research.

Three consecutive lectures will take place as part of this topic complex.

1:00 to 1:40 p.m.: Creative Disruption – Technology innovation, labour demand and the pandemic (Prof. Harald Dale-Olsen)

We utilize a new survey on Norwegian firms’ digitalization and technology investments, linked to population-wide register data and show that the pandemic massively disrupted the technology investment plans of firms, not only postponing investments, but also introducing new technologies. More productive firms innovated, while less productive firms postponed investments. In the short-term, both firm productivities and worker wages increase on average, but this is driven by wage growth for skilled workers. New technologies are associated with increased long-term expected labour demand for skilled workers, and reduced demand for unskilled workers, particularly for the more productive firms.

(joint work with Erlin Barth and Alex Bryson)

1:40 to 2:20 p.m.: Did Covid-19 Accelerate the Digital Transformation? (Terry Gregory)

Using longitudinal survey data on technology use by German firms, matched with administrative worker–firm registers, we assess whether the Covid-19 pandemic accelerated

the adoption of cutting-edge technologies. Our data break down technologies by their application and level of sophistication, as well as capturing the timing of investments and whether the pandemic prompted these investments. We do not find evidence for an overall acceleration effect: Cutting-edge investments did not spike, and while they were more common among firms with higher remote work potential, such firms invested at a greater rate even before the pandemic, and also had more ambitious investment plans pre-pandemic. However, we do find that technologies facilitating remote work were adopted at a greater rate due to the pandemic, and these technologies appeared to have helped firms mitigate the negative employment effects of the crisis.

(joint work with Melanie Arntz, Michael Böhm, Georg Graetz, Florian Lehmer and Cäcilia Lipowski)

2:20 to 3:00 p.m.: The Pandemic Push: Digital Technologies and Workforce Adjustments (Christian Kagerl)

Using novel survey and administrative employer-employee data, we demonstrate that the COVID-19 pandemic was a push factor for the diffusion of digital technologies in Germany. About two out of three firms invested in digital technologies, particularly in hardware and software to enable decentralized communication, management and coordination. These investments also fostered additional firm-sponsored training, underscoring the complementary relationship between investments in digital technologies and training. We then show that the additional investments helped firms to insure their workers against the economic downturn. Firms that made such additional investments were able to retain more of their employees on regular working hours and relied less on short-time work schemes. Low and medium-skilled workers benefited the most from the insurance effect of digital investments.

(joint work with Christina Gathmann, Laura Pohlan and Duncan Roth)

We analyze whether individuals who take on more non-routine job tasks characterized by a low automation risk are rewarded with higher wages.

Little is known about whether changes in job tasks due to technological progress affect personal wages and whether those changes in job tasks relate to the persistent gender wage gap in contemporary Western societies. Following the task-biased technological change approach, we analyze whether individuals who take on more non-routine job tasks characterized by a low automation risk (complex and autonomous tasks) are rewarded with higher wages. We separately analyze men and women and, due to the rigid German labor market, additionally account for job changes as a potential moderator. We use three-wave panel data covering a period of nine years from the German National Educational Panel Study.

Our results from fixed-effects regressions show substantial heterogeneity in the relationship between changes in non-routine job tasks and wages by gender and job change, which is masked when looking at average wage differentials by non-routine job tasks. While both genders benefit from increased task complexity in job changes, the impact is more pronounced for females, helping to slightly narrow the still persistent gender wage gap. However, when taking on more autonomous tasks in job changes, males experience significant benefits, further contributing to the widening of the gender wage gap. In essence, our findings underscore gender-specific monetary returns to increasing non-routine tasks, particularly highlighting the ability of male job changers to monetarize their newly assigned tasks. 

Joint work with Dr. Alexandra Wicht and Dr. Nora Müller.

Students often face incentives to reach performance goals, for instance, to receive a scholarship, enter a college, or be hired for a job.

Students often face incentives to reach performance goals, for instance, to receive a scholarship, enter a college, or be hired for a job. This paper uses a field experiment to study how incentives to reach performance goals affect students, whether the effects vary for students at different parts of the performance distribution, and whether allowing students to choose their own goal improves their performance. We find that incentives backfire: students offered incentives perform worse than their control counterparts.

These negative effects are mainly driven by mismatched goals: the negative treatment effects are concentrated among low-ability students who are assigned a high goal and among students with high aspirations who are assigned a low goal. The effects are also negative but not statistically significant from zero when students are allowed to choose their own goal. Our results show that incentives for performance goals can harm students' performance, especially among students whose goals are mismatched.

Multinational affiliates are more productive than domestic firms, so how do they affect a host country through the labor market?

Multinational affiliates are more productive than domestic firms, so how do they affect a host country through the labor market? We use data for Norway to show that the labor market is characterized by a job ladder, with multinationals on the upper rungs. We calibrate a general equilibrium job ladder model with endogenous multinational entry to the Norwegian data. In a counterfactual where multinationals face an infinite entry cost, payments to labor fall and profits of domestic firms rise, but the impact is heterogeneous. Competition for workers increases low down on the job ladder, while it decreases high up.

My presentation will cover results from two research projects on gender inequality in life courses and later life financial well-being in Germany.

My presentation will cover results from two research projects on gender inequality in life courses and later life financial well-being in Germany, which both rely on linked survey-administrative data. The first study examines how the life courses of couples in East and West Germany are associated with women’s income in later life using multichannel sequence analysis. By applying a couple perspective, we overcome the individualistic approach in most previous research analysing women’s old-age income. Detailed monthly information on spouses’ employment and earnings trajectories from age 20 to 50 for the birth cohorts 1925–1965 stems from SHARE-RV, a data linkage of the administrative records of the German public pension insurance with the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE).

Seven clusters of couples’ life courses are identified and linked to women’s individual income in later life. By means of a cohort comparison, a polarization in dual-earner and male-breadwinner type clusters is identified. The former increasingly diverge into successful female-breadwinner constellations and those with both partners in marginalized careers. The latter polarize between persistent male-breadwinner constellations and those in which women increase their labour market engagement. Second, I will introduce first results from the project "Life Course, Assets and Retirement Income in East and West Germany". It examines gender-specific differences in the interplay of employment histories and the accumulation of wealth comparing East and West Germany. Data basis is the SOEP-RV that links the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) survey to respondents’ Deutsche Rentenversicherung (German Pension Insurance) records.

Joint work with: Babette Bühler, Clara Overweg, Andreas Weiland

Black workers experience a higher unemployment rate, as well as more volatile employment dynamics, than white workers.

Black workers experience a higher unemployment rate, as well as more volatile employment dynamics, than white workers, and the racial unemployment rate gap is largely unexplained by observable characteristics. We develop a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the labor market, endogenous separations, and employer discrimination against Black workers to explain these outcomes. The model is consistent with key features of the aggregate economy and is able to explain key labor market disparities across racial groups. We then use this model to assess the effects of the Federal Reserve's new monetary policy framework—interest rates respond to shortfalls of employment from its maximum level rather than deviations—on racial inequality in the labor market. We find that shifting from a Deviations interest rate rule to a Shortfalls rule reduces the racial unemployment rate gap and the model-based measures of labor market discrimination but increases the average inflation rate. From a welfare perspective, we find that the Shortfalls approach does not do much to reduce racial inequality in our model economy.

This study, investigates firm side responses to generous parental leave mandates.

In this study, we investigate firm side responses to generous parental leave mandates. Our primary focus is on firms’ adjustments in the gender and age composition of their workforce. To identify these effects, we use employer-employee matched data from Norway, and deploy a Bartik-type instrument exploiting variation in exposure and shifts across firms due to a series of expansionary reforms of the duration of paid parental leave. We find that in response to longer parental leave related absence, firms increase demand for young female employees but at lower wages. Heterogeneity analyses reveal that this is particularly the case in the private sector. We also document some positive effects on firm performance measured by investment and productivity. Increased part-time work by young women, and overtime hours by older workers emerge as important mechanisms explaining our results.

Our findings suggest that both small and large firms have successfully adapted to young women’s work interruptions linked to longer parental leave, an issue that has so far been overlooked in labor markets.

The recent surge in inflation led many unions and firms to alter their bargaining and wage-setting policies.

The recent surge in inflation led many unions and firms to alter their bargaining and wage-setting policies. Using novel German firm-level survey data, we document the extent of state dependency of wage-setting behavior across firms and workers given high vs. low inflation environments. The granularity of our micro-level data also allows us to study heterogeneous patterns across sectors, firms, and workers. Embedding the empirical findings in a New Keynesian model with heterogeneous firms, we then analyze the implications of state-dependent wage-setting behavior for the transmission and propagation of shocks. Lastly, we discuss the interaction of state-dependent wage setting with firms' monopsony power and how these features impact monetary policy and the slope of the Phillips curve.

We build a large new Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks.

We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large new Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economy, we quantify the considerable extent to which demographic changes over the last 30 years contribute to the decline of unemployment rate. Our findings have important policy implications given the expected aging of the working population in Europe. Furthermore, lowering inflation volatility is less costly in terms of higher unemployment volatility. It suggests that optimal monetary policy is more hawkish in the older society. Our results hint also at a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle due to the fact that in the US the share of young workers is expected to remain robust.