Gender equality through marriage

Traditionally, a "marriage surplus" was created through specialization of household activities, but in modern times gains from a more egalitarian marriage can be through increased coordination.

We ask for the first time whether marriage can increase gender equality by estimating the causal effect of marriage vs cohabitation on labour market trajectories of new parents. Applying a Marginal Treatment Effects framework, the average treatment effect of marriage is consistent with specialization - marriage causes women to work less and men more. This average effect hides treatment effect heterogeneity across unobservables, whereby the couples "more resistant" to marry - i.e. the more modern couples, exhibit coordination of labour market activities.

There is no longer a marriage penalty to women and the coordinating men earn less if married than if cohabiting. Given this, we ask whether increased gender equality for the coordinators lowers or raises household welfare, finding no effect of marriage on children for specializers or coordinators, and a reduction in separation from marriage for coordinators - suggesting that moving away from masculine male breadwinner norms can improve relationship contentedness.

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