This study is about the effect of finding a job through one’s social contact on starting wages. Using combined SOEP-INKAR data for Germany and propensity score analysis - both matching and weighting - we document that referral hiring is associated with a wage penalty of 10%. This penalty is stable over time. Separating by the type of the social contact, we find that referrals from former colleagues are associated with a 9% wage premium compared to a direct formal application. In contrast, referrals from friends are associated with a 7% wage penalty.
Our results highlight persistent self-selection of workers on observable and unobservable characteristics. Using information from a short test of cognitive abilities (symbol digit test) we document that workers recommended by former colleagues perform best in the ability test, consistent with the predictions from a sorting model. The lowest performance is recorded for those relying on the help of their friends. The effects are primarily driven by the sub-sample of women. No significant differences across search channels are found for personality traits.
Date
23.6.2026
, noon until 1.30 p.m.
Speaker
Anna Zaharieva, Universität Bielefeld
Venue
IAB
Room E10 (Regensburger Str. 100, Nürnberg)
Online participation will be possible via Zoom.
You will recieve the login link along with a short reminder one day before the seminar.
Registration
Researchers who would like to participate, please send an email to macrolabor.seminar@gmail.com
