A constitutional experiment as a form of governance : on the role of the experiment clause in basic income support

Abstract

The article investigates what effect the introduction of the experiment clause in the Social Code II (in the context of the Hartz IV reforms) has on the institutional regulation structures of labour market policy. The central thesis is that in this policy field, for the solution of a legislation dilemma over the experiment clause, a new form of governance has been introduced, which appears as a highly complex and dynamic form of governance modes, and structures both the governance of each implementation model and the strategic interaction relationships between the models. This new form of governance is defined and described as a 'constitutional experiment'. Next, it is investigated which particular interests of collective agents have influenced the development of legal regulation structures and especially of the experiment clause; also, consequences of the new governance form for the respective regulation structures in particular models of operation are discussed. Next to this, the relationship between the change of regulation structures on super-ordinate levels, and processes of institutionalisation of regulation structures and governance modes on subordinate levels is investigated. The author concludes that the interaction of the private competition mode with public and mixed public-private modes of operation lead to a deformation of competition, the consequences of which are discussed in concluding. (IAB)

Cite article

Kaps, P. (2009): Konstitutionelles Experiment als Governanceform. Zur Rolle der Experimentierklausel in der Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende. In: S. Botzem, J. Hofmann, S. Quack, G. F. Schuppert & H. Straßheim (Hrsg.) (2009): Governance als Prozess : Koordinationsformen im Wandel (Schriften zur Governance-Forschung, 16), p. 607-633.