A simple mobility game for couples' migration decisions and some quasi-experimental evidence

Abstract

This paper develops a new theoretical model for couples' migration decisions, called the mobility game. The model describes migration decisions as reliant on the strategic interdependence of two partners. The important implications of this model are as follows: first, under complete information, a household move is the 'natural' solution for stable couples; second, incomplete information allows the tied mover to 'blackmail' the partner and thus to avoid the household move; and third, the decision to commute will depend mostly on the preferences of the potential commuter. The hypotheses derived from this theoretical framework are empirically testable, although the necessary information is difficult to measure. The hypotheses are tested employing a quasi-experimental design known as factorial survey, which allows one to vary systematically the incentives for moving. The empirical results confirm the importance of both strategic reasoning and mechanisms for solving problems of cooperation within the partnership.

Cite article

Abraham, M. & Nisic, N. (2012): A simple mobility game for couples' migration decisions and some quasi-experimental evidence. In: Rationality and society, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 168-197. DOI:10.1177/1043463112440684