Designing labor market recommender systems: the importance of job seeker preferences and competition

This paper questions the design of job recommender systems (RS). We argue that state of the art ML-based algorithmic recommendations aimed at identifying a hiring score from past successful matches do not always result in improved outcomes for job seekers (JS). This is because first, the objectives of these recommendations do not align with the ones of the JS and second, they are usually generated independently of each other, without considering competition. Using a theoretical model of a two-sided market with an application stage, we discuss the needs that RS should meet. We then show that the ML-based hiring score, from which recommendations are typically derived, is only one of the necessary ingredients to meet these needs. Additionally, a matching score between JS and job offer profiles must be considered, and the two should be combined to form a criterion that reflects the expected utility. Our empirical analysis confirms this quantitatively matters, using the RS designed as part of a long-term project in collaboration with the French Public Employment Service. This project leverages extensive and detailed data on applicants, firms, and past job searches. Moreover, we discuss how optimal transport can be leveraged to design RS that avoid congestion, viewing the recommendations as a collective problem rather than a series of individual programs.

Date

Speaker

Venue