Anschubhilfe für Arbeitslose: Internationale Erfahrungen aus den letzten Jahrzehnten
Im Oktober 2024 machte die „Anschubprämie“ von sich reden, ein Vorschlag zur Arbeitslosigkeitsbekämpfung mittels eines starken positiven Anreizes für den Übergang in sozialversicherungspflichtige Jobs. Die Idee: 1.000 Euro für Bürgergeld-beziehende Langzeitarbeitslose, die einen Job annehmen und ein Jahr lang in diesem verbleiben.
Was im Rahmen der Wachstumsinitiative vom Bundeskabinett beschlossen, dann Gegenstand einer polarisierten Debatte wurde und angesichts der vorgezogenen Neuwahl 2025 wohl doch nicht kommen wird, ist andernorts zumindest ausprobiert worden – vor allem in den USA der 1980er Jahre in Form sogenannter „reemployment boni“.
Die in unserem Themendossier gesammelten Literaturhinweise und externen Links zeichnen solche früheren Anreiz-Experimente sowie die aktuelle Debatte nach. Mit dem Filter „Autorenschaft“ können Sie auf IAB-(Mit-)Autorenschaft eingrenzen.
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Literaturhinweis
Implications of the Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiments For Theories of Unemployment and Policy Design (1988)
Meyer, Bruce D.;Zitatform
Meyer, Bruce D. (1988): Implications of the Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiments For Theories of Unemployment and Policy Design. (NBER working paper / National Bureau of Economic Research 2783), Cambridge, Mass, 61 S.
Abstract
"Reemployment bonus experiments offer large lump sum payments to unemployment insurance (UI) recipients who find a job quickly. Such experiments are underway or have been recently completed in four states. This paper analyzes the results from Illinois and discusses the implications of the experiments for theories of unemployment and policy design. I examine the hazard rate of exit from unemployment and find that it is significantly higher for the experimental groups, but only during the period of bonus eligibility. Both labor supply and search theories of unemployment are shown to suggest a rise in the reemployment hazard just before the end of bonus eligibility and to suggest larger effects of the fixed amount bonus for lower income groups. Only weak support is found for these hypotheses, which suggests limitations of the models of unemployment. Some modifications of the models are suggested. The experiments demonstrate the effects of economic incentives on job finding behavior but they do not show the desirability of a permanent reemployment bonus program. Evidence from another sample suggests that as many as half of those who received a reemployment bonus returned to their previous employer, so that a bonus program that pays people returning to their last employer would provide a strong encouragement to temporary layoffs. A discussion of UI claim filing behavior suggests that a permanent program could well increase the frequency or promptness of filing, thus reducing any financial advantages of a bonus program" (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Literaturhinweis
Bonuses to Workers and Employers to Reduce Unemployment: Randomized Trials in Illinois (1987)
Zitatform
Woodbury, Stephen A. & Robert G. Spiegelman (1987): Bonuses to Workers and Employers to Reduce Unemployment: Randomized Trials in Illinois. In: The American economic review, Jg. 77, H. 4, S. 513-530.
Abstract
"New claimants for Unemployment Insurance were randomly assigned to one of two experiments that were designed to speed up the return to work. In the first experiment, a $500 bonus was offered to eligible claimants who obtained employment within 11 weeks. This experiment reduced the number of weeks of insured unemployment, averaged over all assigned claimants whether or not they participated, by more than one week. In the second experiment, the $500 bonus was offered to the subsequent employer of the eligible claimant. This experiment reduced the weeks of insured unemployment for only one important group - white women - by about one week." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))