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Bijwaard, Govert E. & Geert Ridder (2001): Correcting for Selective Compliance in a Re-employment Bonus Experiment. (SSRN papers), Los Angeles, CA, 42 S. DOI:10.2139/ssrn.277747

Abstract

"We propose a two-stage instrumental variable estimator that is consistent if there is selective compliance in the treatment group of a randomized experiment and the outcome variable is a censored duration. The estimator assumes full compliance in the control group. We use the estimator to reanalyze data from the Illinois re-employment bonus experiment." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Bloom, Howard S., Saul Schwartz, Susanna Lui-Gurr, Suk-Won Lee, Jason Peng & Wendy Bancroft (2001): Testing a Financial Incentive to Promote Re-employment among Displaced Workers. The Canadian Earnings Supplement Project (ESP). In: Journal of policy analysis and management, Jg. 20, H. 3, S. 505-523. DOI:10.1002/pam.1005

Abstract

"This article presents findings from a randomized experiment conducted in four Canadian provinces to measure the effects of a generous financial incentive that was designed to promote rapid re-employment among workers who were displaced from their jobs by changing economic conditions. The incentive tested was an earnings supplement which, for as long as 2 years and as much as $250 weekly, would replace 75 percent of the earnings loss incurred by displaced workers who took a new lower-paying full-time job within six months of receiving a supplement offer. Findings from the experiment indicate that although persons offered the supplement understood its terms and conditions, only 2 out of 10 actually received supplement payments. Furthermore, the supplement offer had little effect on job-search behavior, employment prospects, or receipt of unemployment insurance. Nevertheless, persons who received supplement payments benefited from them substantially. On average, they received payments for 64 weeks, totaling $8,705. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, Published by arrangement with John Wiley & Sons) ((en))

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Robins, Philip K. & Robert G. Spiegelman (Hrsg.) (2001): Reemployment bonuses in the unemployment insurance system. Evidence from three field experiments. Kalamazoo: Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 295 S.

Abstract

"During the 1980s, the federal government sponsored social experiments to determine whether or not offers of financial bonuses persuaded recipients of unemployment insurance to return to work sooner. A number of experimental designs were tried and some clear results were seen. While policy makers so far have chosen not to implement such bonus offers, the issue of how to increase active job search among UI recipients remains an issue, and bonus offers constitute one of only a handful of program options at their disposal that might achieve that goal.
In this volume, a select group of UI researchers describes the motivation for and the design, implementation, and impacts of UI bonus experiments administered in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington. They also describe the benefits and costs of the various experimental treatments for the government as a whole, the UI system in particular, claimants' earnings, and the overall net benefits to society. This volume analyzes experiments that are virtually unique for social policy research (i.e., multiple experiments with similar designs that enable comparison of results of experiments conducted in different locations and different social contexts), as well as the movement from experiment to policy by considering impacts on nonparticipants and explicit benefit-cost analysis.
- An introductory chapter, Introduction and Background of the Reemployment Bonus Experiments, by Robert G. Spiegelman, is followed by
- Design of Three Field Experiments, Walter S. Corson and Robert G. Spiegelman. These authors discuss the four elements of an experimental design: 1) who participates, 2) experimental treatments, 3) the number of subjects and their allocation, and 4) experiment location and conditions. They also consider the difficulties related to random assignment and describe experimental operations.
- Participation in the Reemployment Bonus Experiments, Paul T. Decker, Christopher J. O'Leary, and Stephen A. Woodbury. The trio describes the participants and rules of participation in the experiments and then estimates the extent to which UI claimants assigned to the experiments failed to collect bonuses for which they were eligible. The amount 'left on the table' has significant policy implications for any program modeled after the experiments.
- Bonus Impacts on Receipt of Unemployment Insurance, Paul T. Decker, Christopher J. O'Leary, and Stephen A. Woodbury. This chapter presents the primary results of the experiments, namely the effects directly on the UI system. The impact on the dollar value of benefits paid to claimants and the duration of insured unemployment are also estimated.
- Impacts on Employment and Earnings, Paul T. Decker, Christopher J. O'Leary, and Stephen A. Woodbury. The authors discuss a group of supplementary results from the experiments, primarily the impact of the treatments on the earnings of claimants, the nature and quality of jobs, and employer attachment.
- From Social Experiment to Program, Carl Davidson and Stephen A. Woodbury. Davidson and Woodbury provide the bridge from experiment to program by discussing issues inherent in translating experimental results into operational programs. The authors also attempt to quantify the effects of a bonus offer in a full program on the 'entry effect' (the tendency to increase filing for UI benefits) and on 'displacement,' or crowding out (the tendency for participants to increase job acquisition at the expense of nonparticipants).
- A Benefit-Cost Analysis of a Bonus Offer Program, Robert G. Spiegelman. Spiegelman presents the results of a benefit-cost analysis that shows the net benefits to society, the government, the UI system, and claimants that can be derived from a bonus offer program.
- Summary and Policy Implications, Philip K. Robins. Robins presents an overview of the features and findings of the experiments, as well as the policy implications derived from them. The expected effects of a bonus offer program on work effort and the UI system are described, as is why an experimental approach to answering the questions seems warranted. Four cost-effective policies aimed at reducing insured unemployment are also discussed." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Jahn, Elke J. & Thomas Wagner (2000): Senkt aktive Jobsuche die Arbeitslosigkeit? (WEP-working paper 04), Erlangen u.a., 39 S.

Abstract

"Arbeitslose verbessern durch aktive Jobsuche ihre Vermittlungschance, doch der Schluß, daß aktive Jobsuche die aggregierte Arbeitslosigkeit reduziert, beruht auf einer fallacy of composition. Der Arbeitslosenpool besteht aus heterogenen Typen, deren typspezifische Übergangsraten unterschiedlich auf die Zahl der aktiven Jobsucher unter den konkurrierenden Arbeitslosengruppen und die Zahl der offerierten Vakanzen reagieren. Das Modell zeigt, warum Arbeitsmarktpolitik, die darauf zielt, mit Suchvorschriften oder Wiederbeschäftigungsprämien die Anzahl der aktiven Jobsucher unter den Arbeitslosen zu erhöhen, die aggregierte Arbeitslosigkeit steigern kann." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)

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Smith, Jeffrey (2000): Evaluation aktiver Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Erfahrungen aus Nordamerika. In: Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Jg. 33, H. 3, S. 345-356.

Abstract

Der Beitrag untersucht die Lehren, die aus der Evalutionsforschung in den USA für die Wirkungsforschung der deutschen Arbeitsmarktpolitik gezogen werden können. Der Autor betrachtet zunächst die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen, innerhalb derer Evaluation stattfindet: Welche Individuen, Unternehmen oder Organisationen führen Evaluationen durch, wer sind die Auftraggeber und wer evaluiert - explizit oder implizit - die Evaluatoren. Es wird argumentiert, dass diese institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen eine entscheidende Rolle dabei spielen, ob Evaluationen objektiv durchgeführt werden und somit der Poliltik und öffentlichen Meinung von Nutzen sein können. Die zweite Fragestellung betrifft die Wahl zwischen verschiedenen ökonometrischen Evaluationsmethoden. Der Autor argumentiert, dass bei der Methodenwahl und der Interpretation der Ergebnisse berücksichtigt werden muss, dass der Einfluss eines Programms zwischen den Individuen variieren kann. Anschließend werden Kosten und Nutzen von sozialen Experimenten und die Einsatzmöglichkeiten der jüngeren Propensity Score Matching Methoden angesprochen. Zum Abschluss wird auf die Bedeutung von allgemeinen Gleichgewichtseffekten in der Evaluationsforschung eingegangen. (IAB2)

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Davidson, Carl & Stephen A. Woodbury (1996): Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment: Implications of the Reemployment Bonus Experiments. (Upjohn Institute working paper 44), Kalamazoo, Mich., 28 S. DOI:10.17848/wp96-44

Abstract

"We translate the results of the three reemployment bonus experiments that were conducted during the 1980s into (a) impacts of a 10-percentage point increase in the Unemployment Insurance (UI) replacement rate on the expected duration of unemployment; and (b) impacts of adding 1 week to the potential duration of UI benefits on the expected duration of unemployment. Our approach is to use an equilibrium search and matching model, calibrated using data from the bonus experiments and secondary sources. The results suggest that a 10-percentage point increase in the UI replacement rate increases the expected duration of unemployment by .3 to 1.1 week (a range consistent with, but only somewhat narrower than, the existing range of estimates), and that adding 1 week to the potential duration of UI benefits increases the expected duration of unemployment by .05 to .2 week (which is toward the low end of existing estimates)." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Walter, Corson & Haimson Joshua (1996): The New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration Project: Six-year follow-up and summary report. Revised edition. (Unemployment insurance occasional paper 1996,02), Washington DC, 173 S.

Abstract

"The purpose of the New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration Project (NJUIRDP) was to examine whether the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system could be used to identify displaced workers early in their unemployment spells and to provide them with alternative, early intervention services to accelerate their return to work. This second follow-up study extended the analysis for approximately six years after the initial UI claim to identify any long-run treatment impacts, particularly for trainees. This follow-up evaluation found additional long-run UI impacts suggesting that each component of the treatments--JSA, training, and the reemployment bonus--probably contributed to the longer-term impacts and that the treatments, in general, generated jobs that were more stable than those found by control group members." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Decker, Paul T. & Christopher J. O'Leary (1995): Evaluating pooled evidence from the reemployment bonus experiments. In: The Journal of Human Resources, Jg. 30, H. 3, S. 534-550.

Abstract

Die Autoren gehen der Frage nach, ob durch einen Wiederbeschäftigungs-Bonus an die Unternehmen Arbeitslose wieder schneller eine Erwerbsarbeit aufnehmen können. Die Autoren verneinen die Frage. (IAB)

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Meyer, Bruce D. (1995): Lessons from the U.S. unemployment insurance experiments. In: Journal of Economic Literature, Jg. 33, H. 1, S. 91-131.

Abstract

Der Autor berichtet über experimentelle Reformansätze der Arbeitslosenversicherung in den USA, die die Wiederbeschäftigungschancen verbessern sollen und evaluiert die Ergebnisse dieser Programme. Dabei handelte es sich zum einen um Bonus-Experimente (Arbeitslose, die eine neue Stelle fanden, erhielten eine Bonus-Zahlung), zum anderen um Programme, bei denen die Betroffenen mehr Informationen über offene Stellen erhielten, aber auch verschärften Anspruchsvoraussetzungen für Arbeitslosenunterstützung unterworfen waren. (IAB)

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O'Leary, Christopher J., Robert G. Spiegelman & Kenneth J. Kline (1995): Do Bonus Offers Shorten Unemployment Insurance Spells? Results from the Washington Experiment. In: Journal of policy analysis and management, Jg. 14, H. 2, S. 245-269. DOI:10.2307/3325152

Abstract

"Unemployment insurance is intended to reduce hardship by providing labor force members with partial wage replacement during periods of involuntary unemployment. However, in performing this income maintenance function, unemployment insurance may prolong spells of unemployment. Evidence from a field experiment conducted in Illinois in 1984 suggested that offering unemployment insurance claimants a modest cash bonus for rapid reemployment would increase the speed of return to work and reduce program costs. In 1988 a similar experiment, examining several different bonus offers, was conducted in the state of Washington. Evidence from the Washington experiment indicates that bonus offers do change job seeking behavior, but that only relatively generous bonus offers--about six times the weekly benefit amount--should be expected to significantly change the behavior of people eligible for unemployment benefits." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, Published by arrangement with John Wiley & Sons) ((en))

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Decker, Paul T. (1994): The Impact of Reemployment Bonuses on Insured Unemployment in the New Jersey and Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiments. In: The Journal of Human Resources, Jg. 29, H. 3, S. 718-741.

Abstract

"Separate social experiments conducted in New Jersey and Illinois tested the effect of offering Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants a cash bonus for rapid reemployment. The Illinois bonus was constant over time, while the New Jersey bonus declined over time, so that the bonus received was greater the earlier that reemployment occurred. This paper compares the effects of the bonus offers on the rate at which claimants exited UI. The New Jersey and Illinois bonus offers generated similar increases in the UI exit rate during the period in which claimants could qualify for the bonus. However, the declining New Jersey bonus had little impact on long-term claimants who exhausted their UI benefits. In contrast, the constant Illinois bonus had a substantial impact on long-term claimants, thereby reducing the rate at which claimants exhausted their UI benefits. This finding at least partly explains why the Illinois bonus had a larger impact on UI receipt than the New Jersey bonus." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, © the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System) ((en))

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O'Leary, Christopher J. (1994): A Reemployment Incentives Experiment in Canada: Issues in Design, Administration and Evaluation. (Reports / W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research), Kalamazoo, Mich., 21 S.

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Davidson, Carl & Stephen A. Woodbury (1993): The Displacement Effect of Reemployment Bonus Programs. In: Journal of labor economics, Jg. 11, H. 4, S. 575-605. DOI:10.1086/298308

Abstract

"We develop a partial equilibrium matching model of the labor market in order to examine whether adoption of a reemployment bonus would displace workers not offered the bonus. We examine the displacement effect for (a) unemployment insurance (UI)-eligible workers who are offered but do not find a job in time to qualify for a bonus and (b) UI-ineligible workers who are never offered a bonus. The model predicts minimal displacement of the former group. But for the latter group, the model predicts an increase in unemployment duration of .2-.4 week and an increase in unemployment of up to 2 per thousand." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Anderson, Patricia M. (1992): Time-Varying Effects of Recall Expectation, a Reemployment Bonus, and Job Counseling on Unemployment Durations. In: Journal of labor economics, Jg. 10, H. 1, S. 99-115. DOI:10.1086/298280

Abstract

"A simple search model that includes the possibility of recall provides predictions as to the changing effects of recall expectations, a bonus offer, and job counseling on new job finding rates over time. Using data from the New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration Project (NJUIRDP), I find evidence for an initial positive effect of the bonus offer, which diminishes over time. New job-finding rates are found to be negatively affected by higher initial recall expectations. This effect also diminishes over time, and evidence suggests that job counseling is successful in speeding up this process." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Corson, Walter, Paul Decker, Shari Dunstan & Stuart Kerachsky (1992): Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Demonstration. Final Report. (Unemployment insurance occasional paper 1992,06), Washington DC, 254 S.

Abstract

"The Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Demonstration tested the effect of alternative reemployment bonuses on the reemployment and UI receipt of UI claimants. The demonstration showed that reeemployment bonuses can reduce the amount of time spent on UI, thereby reducing benefit payments. The demonstration also provided some evidence that the bonus offers increased the employment and earnings of claimants." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Kettunen, Juha (1992): Increasing Incentives for Re-employment. (Discussion papers / Research Institute of the Finnish Economy 415), Helsinki, 30 S.

Abstract

"This paper studies the incentives of unemployed workers for reemployment using search models and semi-parametric econometric methods with applications for individual data on unemployment durations. It is shown that the reemployment probability can be increased substantially by offering reemployment bonuses to the unemployed workers. Other means of encouraging the workers are to remove the protective rules regarding labour mobility of the Finnish Unemployment Insurance Act and to reduce the benefits after a fixed period of unemployment. Politically this may be difficult, but on the other hand the welfare of all the unemployed persons can be increased by removing the waiting period of benefits." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Kim, Iljoong (1992): The effectiveness of a reemployment bonus. In: Economics Letters, Jg. 39, H. 3, S. 345-351. DOI:10.1016/0165-1765(92)90272-z

Abstract

"This paper investigates the effectiveness of the recently proposed reemployment bonus, relative to the regular Unemployment Insurance benefits, in a model where endogenous search effort plays a crucial role and the bonus is fully portrayed as an incentive contract." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, © 1992 Elsevier) ((en))

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Meyer, Bruce D. (1992): Policy Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Experiments. (NBER working paper / National Bureau of Economic Research 4197), Cambridge, Mass, 63 S.

Abstract

"Recently, there has been extensive experimental evaluation of reforms of the unemployment insurance (UI) system. The UI experiments can be divided into two main areas: reemployment bonuses and job search programs. The four reemployment bonus experiments offered payments to UI recipients who found jobs quickly and kept them for a specified period of time. The six job search experiments evaluated combinations of services including additional information on job openings, more job placements, and more extensive checks of UI eligibility. The bonus experiments show that economic incentives do affect the speed with which people leave the unemployment insurance rolls. They also show that speeding claimants' return to work appears to increase total earnings following the claim, but the evidence is less strong. They also suggest that the rate of pay on the new job is not adversely affected by an earlier return to work. Despite these encouraging results, I argue that the experiments do not show that permanent adoption of a reemployment bonus would be beneficial as they cannot account for the effect of a reemployment bonus on the size of the claimant population. The job search experiments test several reforms that appear more promising. Nearly all of the combinations of services and increased enforcement reduce UI receipt, and have benefits that exceed costs. The treatments which mainly increase enforcement of work search rules have small but often statistically significant effects. The experiments which focus more on providing services induce much larger reductions in UI receipt, but at a higher cost of services per claimant. Nevertheless, these experiments have very favorable ratios of benefits to costs." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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O'Leary, Christopher J., Robert Spiegelman & Kenneth J. Kline (1992): The Washington Reemployment Bonus Experiment. Final Report. (Unemployment insurance occasional paper 1992,06), Washington DC, 227 S.

Abstract

"The purpose of the Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) was to validate results of the previous experiments, test a new range of reemployment bonus plans, and identify the most cost-effective plan. WREB was designed by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research in collaboration with the Washington State Employment Security Department (WSESD) and the USDOL." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

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Davidson, Carl & Stephen A. Woodbury (1991): Effects of a Reemployment Bonus under Differing Benefit Entitlements, or, Why the Illinois Experiment Worked. Presented at the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM), Twelfth Annual Research Conference, San Francisco, CA, October 18-20. (Conference papers / W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research), Kalamazoo, Mich., 58 S.

Abstract

"Fifty-eight percent of the workers enrolled in the Illinois Claimant Bonus experiment were eligible for 38 weeks of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits--26 weeks of state-regular benefits plus 12 weeks of Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC). The other 42 percent were eligible for only 26 weeks of state-regular UI benefits. We find that the Claimant Bonus treatment--an offer of $500 in cash for rapid reemployment--reduced the duration of insured unemployment by about 1.8 weeks for workers who were eligible for 38 weeks of UI benefits, but by only about 0.75 week for the workers who were eligible for 26 weeks of UI. We specify a search/matching model for each of the two groups (FSC-eligible and -ineligible) and find that (a) the model predicts a far larger bonus impact for workers eligible for 38 weeks of benefits than for those eligible for 26 weeks, and (b) the model's quantitative predictions cannot be rejected by the data." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))